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ABSTRACT
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by Viet Dung Dang
The concept of Virtual Organisations (VOs) or Virtual Enterprises (VEs) is rapidly
emerging as an important topic in many areas of computing including e-commerce, grid
computing and the semantic Web. One reason for this interest is that VOs provide a
means of bringing together a number of autonomous stakeholders in a dynamic fashion
in order to address a speciﬁc problem or niche. These agents then work together for
some period of time and then disband when it is deemed appropriate to do so. There
are, however, many technical, social and economic issues associated with this VO life-
cycle (i.e. creation, operation, maintenance and dissolution) that need to be addressed
before VOs can be considered to be practicable. While previous technical work on VOs
has concentrated on providing tools to support diﬀerent aspects of the VO lifecycle,
comparatively little work has focused on the mechanisms for automated VO creation,
operation and maintenance. To address this shortcoming, this research aims to study
and design mechanisms for the VO creation, operation and maintenance phases. In this
thesis, our approach is to use combinatorial auctions and coalition formation mecha-
nisms. In particular, novel algorithms for clearing multi-unit single-item and multi-unit
combinatorial auctions have been developed as a means of tackling VO creation and one
part of VO maintenance. A novel algorithm for coalition structure generation has also
been developed to address VO operation and another part of VO maintenance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
An increasing number of computer systems are being developed to operate in open, net-
worked environments such as the Internet and the Grid. Moreover, in many such cases,
these systems are populated with independent components that have been developed
by diﬀerent stakeholders, each of which has their own aims and objectives. To achieve
these aims and objectives, the components invariably need to interact with one another
in ﬂexible ways. In particular, a key form of interaction is when a number of initially
distinct components come together to form a temporary alliance (or virtual organisation)
to achieve a particular objective.
Against this background, this research develops new methods for forming, maintaining,
and managing virtual organisations (VOs). Speciﬁcally, the independent components
are viewed as autonomous agents that can act in ﬂexible ways in order to provide and
deliver particular services [Jennings and Wooldridge, 1995]. Then, when the need for a
new VO is detected, these agents participate in online auctions in order to indicate what
contributions they are willing to make (if any) and under what terms and conditions.
Here these terms and conditions relate to the other services that the agent is contributing
to the VO and the quantity of its contribution of the various services (e.g. if an agent is
contributing many diﬀerent services or a large number of a particular service then the
unit price for the service may be less than if it has a smaller role). However, developing
auctions that can express such relationships is a challenging task and has required the
development of new algorithms to determine which sets of agents and bids should be
1
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selected1. Having determined the participants of the VO and their various contributions,
speciﬁc tasks need to be allocated to the individual participants. Again this is a complex
decision making task (because it needs to ﬁnd an eﬃcient allocation among a very large
number of possible allocations) and has required the development of new algorithms for
achieving this in an optimal fashion. Finally, in the types of environment in which VOs
are most useful, there is likely to be signiﬁcant degrees of dynamism as new tasks are
added and existing ones are removed or modiﬁed. To cope with this, the aforementioned
algorithms have been developed in such a way that they can also re-conﬁgure the VO
once it is operational. In short, therefore, this thesis is concerned with developing
eﬃcient mechanisms to automate the creation, operation and maintenance of the VO
lifecycle.
In more detail, this ﬁrst chapter gives a brief overview of the virtual organisation research
area and sets the basic background for the research developed in this thesis. In particular,
section 1.1 introduces the ﬁeld of virtual organisations and reviews some signiﬁcant
projects that have been undertaken in this area. Building on this, section 1.2 states the
speciﬁc objectives of this research and section 1.3 details its main contributions. Finally,
section 1.4 outlines how the remainder of the thesis is organised.
1.1 Virtual Organisations
The concept of Virtual Organisations (VOs) is rapidly emerging as an important topic
of research in many areas of computing. It is becoming so important because ever more
open distributed systems are being developed and, in such cases, VOs provide a means
for related entities to band together to deliver services that no one single component
can provide. In particular, this thesis concentrates on the use of VOs in the context of
e-business, although the technologies developed in this work are more widely applicable
(see section 1.3 for more details).
In e-commerce, vigourous competition, as well as a fast-changing business environment,
forces companies to focus on their core competences, keep a high degree of ﬂexibility,
1This kind of algorithm is called an auction clearing algorithm or a winner determination algorithm.
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and collaborate with other companies to enhance their competitive advantages to ensure
their very survival [Beer et al., 1990]. Moreover, creating added value for the customer is
becoming an increasingly complex process that involves the combination of a great many
diﬀerent types of knowledge that the separate organisations do not necessarily possess.
Therefore, many have come to understand that the key to competitive advantage is
to transform the way they function [Beer et al., 1990]. In particular, it is recognised
that ﬁrms should not operate in isolation, but, in fact, their success depends on the
relationships with diﬀerent parties including competitors, complementors (horizontal
relationships) and buyers and suppliers (vertical relationships) [Porter, 1980].
Now, in a market characterised by rigorous competition, one way to succeed is to col-
laborate with these related parties to promote synergies via increasing market power,
lessening competition, specialisation and economy of scale (advantages gained from high
output production)) [Contractor and Lorange, 1988]. As a consequence of this, the
Virtual Organisation (VO) model — viewed as a “temporary consortium or alliance
of individual/organisations formed to share costs and skills and exploit fast-changing
opportunities” (adapted from [NIIIP, 1998]) — is becoming ever more important [NI-
IIP, 1998]. By means of an example, consider the situation in which a number of media
providers (e.g. news, movies and music providers), mobile operators, and mobile handset
manufacturers come together to make a VO to provide advanced customised multimedia
services for fourth-generation (4G) mobile phone users [Norman et al., 2003] [Norman et
al., 2004]. With this service, a mobile phone user can order a customised combination
of movies, news and music and get them sent to his/her mobile phone. This is valuable
because for the companies, they can increase their competitiveness by providing this
new service, while saving costs via specialisation.
In more detail, the VO model oﬀers several potential superior advantages over the inde-
pendent organisation and traditional collaborative models (such as mergers, acquisitions
and joint ventures).
We will start with the traditional advantages of a collaborative relationship over the
independent organisation (as such, they apply both for the VO model and traditional
collaborative models). First, it oﬀers opportunities to improve productivity, eﬃciency
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and optimises resources through specialisation [NIIIP, 1998]. While these advantages are
typical of a collaborative relationship over an independent organisation, they are better
realised in the VO model because the VO members focus on their core competences
only [Sieber and Griese, 1998]. In the 4G mobile phone example above, for instance,
the mobile operators would be better oﬀ not manufacturing the mobile handsets by
themselves, but rather they should leave this to the handset manufacturer and concen-
trate on their core competences of providing mobile network coverage. Secondly, a VO
enables its members to provide new services that they themselves cannot deliver. For
example, none of the individual companies in the 4G mobile phone example can provide
the combined service (customised multimedia service) by itself. Thus, it allows com-
panies to access new markets with competitive solutions [Hardwick and Bolton, 1997].
This also increases the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) because
SMEs usually cannot provide a wide range of services as they have very limited resource,
compared to large multi-national companies. This is especially true given the current
situation in which SMEs are usually subcontracted by a large company, which makes
them very dependent on the contracting company [Neubert et al., 2001]. Meanwhile,
for customers, it means they can have combined services conveniently with one point of
contact — the VO — instead of having to contact diﬀerent companies for diﬀerent parts
of the combined services.
Beside the aforementioned traditional advantages of a collaborative relationship over
the independent organisation, the VO model also oﬀers additional advantages over tra-
ditional collaborative models. First, it provides a great deal of agility in that the nature
of the VO can be continually adjusted according to the prevailing market context. Thus,
it enables a rapid response to changes and opportunities in the dynamic business en-
vironment [Sieber and Griese, 1998]. For example, in the 4G mobile phone scenario
above, the VO can adjust its structure (add/remove members) to cope with changes
in the business environment (for instance, they can add more members into the VO to
provide additional service when there is a demand for it). Second, the VO members
retain their entrepreneurial independence. For example, in the 4G mobile phone sce-
nario, the media providers, network coverage providers and handset providers are still
independent ﬁrms after joining the VO. This is diﬀerent from mergers and acquisitions,
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in which it is usually the case that the joining ﬁrms no longer exist as independent ﬁrms.
For example, after the HP - Compaq merger, Compaq no longer exists. Entrepreneurial
independence is desirable for a ﬁrm’s owners and/or managers, because they can keep
the control of their ﬁrm and the entrepreneurial identity is retained. Third, the VO part-
ners should be able to unite quickly without lengthy negotiations and disband without
any problems. Traditional collaborative models, for example, mergers and acquisitions
as well as joint ventures, require lengthy and very costly procedures (especially the costs
for ﬁnancial adviser ﬁrms and legal adviser ﬁrms), for alliance creation and dissolution.
This is because, for example, in the case of mergers and acquisitions, ﬁrms are merged
permanently and so require a lot more time and cost in terms of legal and ﬁnancial
advising.
To fully realise these beneﬁts, however, it is necessary to make extensive use of a range
of information technologies. Thus there is starting to be considerable research in this
area (see chapter 2 for more details). However, although these projects provide a vari-
ety of tools to support diﬀerent aspects of the VO lifecycle, the degree of automation
provided is still somewhat rudimentary. In particular, existing systems typically pro-
vide the available information to humans who are actually responsible for the decision
making. However this is a lengthy and time consuming process that could be made
signiﬁcantly faster and more eﬃcient if it was automated. Thus this research develops
various algorithms that will help automate the creation, operation and maintenance of
VOs.
1.2 Research Objectives
There are many technical advances that need to be made before the VO lifecycle can
be fully automated. These can be organised according to the VO lifecycle, which is
composed of creation, operation, maintenance2 and dissolution (see ﬁgure 1.1).
In more detail, the creation phase involves one or more of the entities coming to believe
that it might be worthwhile to create a VO. This entity then contacts a number of
2The maintenance phase is also called the “modiﬁcation phase” in [Camarinha-Matos and Afsar-
manesh, 1999].
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Figure 1.1: The VO lifecycle.
potential participants to determine whether they would be willing to join the VO, and,
if it is successful, this will establish a group that are willing to work together in the
context of the VO. The operation phase occurs once the VO has been created and is
concerned with the way tasks are decomposed and distributed between the participants.
The maintenance phase occurs when the VO structure (the members and the agreed task
distribution) need to be changed. This can happen for a number of reasons including the
failure in carrying out the contract of a VO member, or the bankruptcy of a VO member,
or some change in the business environment. Finally, the dissolution phase occurs when
the VO is disbanded because it is no longer deemed eﬀective. This may happen because
the combined service that the VO provides is obsolete, no longer needed, or because the
VO is no longer making proﬁt.
In the remainder of this section, the main research issues associated with each phase
are detailed and the particular focus of this thesis is given. The thesis does not deal
with the dissolution phase because the scope for automation in this phase is somewhat
limited. In particular, this phase mostly concerns legal aspects or a technical analysis
of the VO’s performance and VO members’ performance.
Underpinning all the phases, however, is the view that the distinct entities in the system
are represented as software agents [Jennings and Wooldridge, 1995]. Here a software
agent can be viewed as an autonomous software entity that is capable of acting ﬂexibly
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in a changing environment [Jennings and Wooldridge, 1995]. These agents are capable
of providing one or more services in the VO and in so doing each agent is assumed to
be interested in maximising their individual gain (when it wants to join the VO) or the
VO gain (when it is a member of the VO). Software agents were chosen as the basic
representation because they are well-suited for environments that are open, changeable,
complex, with decentralised control [Jennings and Wooldridge, 1995] — which is the
type of environment that VOs operate on.
1.2.1 The Creation Phase
In the creation phase, the main research issues are identiﬁcation of needs, enterprise
capability representation, partner search and partner selection mechanisms (see section
2.1 for more details). This research will focus on partner selection mechanism issue
because it is arguably the most important step in this phase.
Partner selection occurs once the VO initiator has identiﬁed the task that needs to
be solved, as well as the skills and capacities needed from the prospective members of
the VO. In this context, the key issue is to determine what mechanism should be used
to select the best partners for the VO. This is arguably the most critical step in the
creation phase because choosing the appropriate partners is central to the success of
the VO, while making the wrong choice can lead to a poorly performing VO. There are
several requirements that need to be met by this process:
• The most suitable set of partners from those that are available should be selected.
In this context, most suitable means the ones with the lowest cost of providing
the services. The cost here does not only mean the monetary value of the services
but may be a combined rating value, calculated from monetary value and other
attributes of the services oﬀered by the partners (e.g. delivery time) so that the cost
can be considered more accurately and thoroughly. For example, in the 4G mobile
phone example, the cost of the network coverage service provided by a mobile
operator does not mean monetary value but may be calculated by combining this
value with the quality rating of the network coverage.
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• The selection should occur within a computationally reasonable time frame so that
the market niche can be exploited as it becomes available. For example, the VO in
the 4G mobile phone example needs to be setup quickly before other competitors
recognise the niche.
• The potential partners should be able to vary their potential involvement in the
VO. This is because this ﬂexibility will allow more potential partners to join the
selection process and so should lead to a better formed VO. Thus, for example, a
partner may be willing to complete services more cheaply if it has a high degree of
involvement in the VO (because the intrinsic costs can be depreciated over many
instances). In contrast, if an agent has a comparatively small involvement then
the unit cost may be much higher. For example, in the 4G mobile phone example,
media providers should be able to vary the number of services, as well as the
quantity of each service, that they will potentially provide for the VO.
There have been several approaches to this problem (e.g. using auctions or utilising
mobile agents). However, they either do not provide a suﬃcient degree of automation
or they do not give the VO’s potential partners enough ﬂexibility to vary their potential
involvement in the VO (see subsection 2.1.1 for more details). Thus, given the open and
competitive nature of the environment, we believe this creation process is best achieved
using some form of marketplace structure, in particular, using some form of auction (an
auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource alloca-
tion and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants [McAfee and McMillan,
1987]). Markets are chosen because they provide a highly eﬀective structure for allo-
cating resources in situations in which there are many self-interested and autonomous
stakeholders.
There are, however, many diﬀerent types of auction (see [Wurman, 2001] for a classiﬁ-
cation) but in this work it was decided to adopt a combinatorial auction approach. A
combinatorial auction is a sophisticated type of auction where multiple units of multiple
(potentially inter-related) items are traded simultaneously (if there is only a single unit
of each type of item, the auctions are called single-unit combinatorial auctions, whereas
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if there are multiple units of each type of item, the auctions are called multi-unit combi-
natorial auctions [Sandholm et al., 2002]). This particular type of auction is suitable for
this problem because it provides the potential partners with a high degree of ﬂexibility
in expressing their requirements. Thus, in the 4G mobile scenario, for example, media
providers can vary the number of services, as well as the quantity of each service that
they intend to provide for the VO, in their bids. For instance, a media provider can
make a bid of providing 10 movies/month and 5 songs/day for a total price of 50. No
other type of auction allows such ﬂexibility.
However, the main disadvantages of combinatorial auctions stem from the lack of com-
putationally tractable clearing algorithms, that is, algorithms for determining the
prices, quantities and trading partners as a function of the bids made.3 Without such
algorithms, combinatorial auctions are not really practicable because the time it takes
to determine the winners is exponential [Sandholm et al., 2002]. This means there may
be unacceptable delays for auctions that have only a medium number of participants or
items. Thus, a large portion of the research is devoted to developing tractable clearing
algorithms for combinatorial auctions that determine the set of winners in a sub-optimal
way (e.g. the solution is within a ﬁnite bound of the optimal) 4. However, for auctions
those have a small number of participants and a small number of items, it is possible
to determine the optimal set of winners even with exponential algorithms.5 Thus, the
thesis also develops optimal clearing algorithms for combinatorial auctions that apply
for wide classes of bidding functions.
1.2.2 The Operation Phase
In the operation phase, the main research issues are task distribution mechanism and
partner collaboration support tools(see section 2.1 for more details). This research will
focus on task distribution mechanism because although it is one of the deciding factors
for the success of the VO, it has been largely neglected in the literature.
3The clearing problem in auctions is also called the winner determination problem [Sandholm et al.,
2002] or the bid evaluation problem [Eso et al., 2001].
4It has been shown that it is impossible for a polynomial (e.g. tractable) algorithm to determine the
optimal set of winners, unless P = NP [Sandholm and Suri, 2001].
5Appropriate ﬁgures for these are around 20 - 30 for the number of participants and 10 - 20 for the
number of items.
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In particular, the focus is on what mechanism can be used to automate the distribution of
tasks in order to cope with the unexpected conditions of the environment and the ﬂexible
nature of VOs. For example, in the 4G mobile scenario, once the VO has been formed,
a mechanism is needed to automate the distribution of mobile phone users’ requests for
personalised media services. Generally speaking, this problem has been largely neglected
in the literature; most of the work related to this phase has concentrated on the IT
infrastructure needed for coordinated resource sharing and problem solving between the
VO members (again, see chapter 2 for more details). In this thesis the approach is
to use techniques from coalition formation, a branch of multi-agent systems research
[Sandholm et al., 1999] based on game theory [Rapoport and Kahan, 1984] that provides
solutions to partition a set of agents into various subsets in order to maximise some
criteria of eﬃciency and/or stability. This approach is chosen because it provides a
provably optimal way to distribute tasks to sub-groups of the VO members.
While there has been an extensive amount of work in coalition formation (see section
2.3 for more details), one of the main problems that hinders the wide spread adoption
of this technology is the computational complexity of coalition structure generation.
That is, once a group of agents has been identiﬁed, how can it be partitioned into sub-
groups in order to maximise the social payoﬀ for the group? This problem has been
shown to be NP-hard and even ﬁnding a sub-optimal solution requires searching an
exponential number of solutions [Sandholm et al., 1999]. Thus, this research concentrates
on developing more eﬃcient coalition structure generation algorithms.
1.2.3 The Maintenance Phase
In the maintenance phase, the main research issues are how to add new members into
the VO and how to distribute or redistribute the necessary tasks between the members
of the new structure. In particular, in a dynamic environment, there are two main
situations that may arise:
• The situation changes, but the members remain unchanged. This means that
the work distribution between VO members needs to be reorganised. Again, this
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research uses coalition formation algorithms to partition a VO’s members into
various subsets working on various activities to seek maximal eﬃciency.
• Some members fail or withdraw from the VO: in such cases, the VO will have to
ﬁnd the substitutes. In order to do this, the research applies similar mechanisms
to those that are used in the creation phase. The main diﬀerence is, in this case,
only some members of the VO need to be substituted. For instance, in the 4G
mobile phone example, when a mobile network operator withdraws from the VO,
we use the auction mechanism to select the additional operators to replace this
operator.
1.3 Research Contributions
The research described in this thesis makes signiﬁcant contributions to the state of the
art in the areas of auction clearing algorithms and coalition structure generation.
In more detail, the contributions to auction clearing algorithms are as follows:
• Novel polynomial clearing algorithms were developed for multi-unit single-item
and multi-unit combinatorial forward and reverse auctions with demand/supply
function bidding that satisﬁes discount and free disposal properties [Dang and
Jennings, 2002] [Dang and Jennings, 2004b]. No previous polynomial algorithms
exist for this broad class of auctions. And although multi-unit single-item auctions
are not our main target case, our algorithms for this setting still represents a
contribution in its own right. While Sandholm and Suri’s algorithms target the
same environment as this, they are only applicable in the speciﬁc case where the
supply curves are linear [Sandholm and Suri, 2001]. In contrast, our result is
applicable to the more general case; that is, discount, free disposal supply curves.
Moreover, the algorithms are shown to produce a solution that is within a ﬁnite
bound of the optimal. Finally, our empirical results show for realistic settings, their
solutions are within a much smaller bound (than the proved theoretical bound) of
the optimal.
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• Novel optimal clearing algorithms were developed for multi-unit single-item and
multi-unit combinatorial forward and reverse auctions with demand/supply func-
tion bidding [Dang and Jennings, 2003]. This was carried out for two sets of
bidding functions6: piece-wise linear and monotonic one-unit-diﬀerence.7 This
set of algorithms is necessarily not polynomial, but is guaranteed to produce the
optimal allocation.8 Again no previous optimal algorithms existed for this class of
auctions.
The contributions to the area of coalition structure generation are as follows:
• A novel anytime algorithm for coalition structure generation was developed that
can produce solutions within a ﬁnite bound from the optimal [Dang and Jennings,
2004a]. This algorithm is anytime — it can be interrupted at any time, and it
establishes a monotonically improving bound from the optimal. Most previous
work in this area cannot give such guarantees for its solutions (see section 2.3 for
more details). The only other algorithm that can establish a worst-case bound
from the optimal is [Sandholm et al., 1999] and our algorithm was shown to be
signiﬁcantly faster. For example, with bound 3, our algorithm is more than 107
times faster for n = 50, more than 1023 times faster for n = 100, more than 10171
times faster for n = 500, and more than 10379 times faster for n = 1000.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows.
The next chapter gives a more in depth analysis of existing approaches to virtual organ-
isations. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrst, it explains the problem of partner selection in VOs. In this
context, it discusses the use of auctions to solve this problem, and explains the need for
6Bidding functions are the functions that specify the relation between the quantity of the items and
the price in the bids
7piece-wise linear bidding functions are those in which the demand/supply curves for each individual
commodity are composed of many linear segments, while monotonic one-unit-diﬀerence functions are
those in which the function indicating the price for adding one more single unit into a package is
monotonic (non-increasing or non-decreasing).
8It will be shown that an algorithm that produces the optimal allocation cannot be polynomial unless
P = NP (see chapter 3 and 4 for more details).
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clearing algorithms for combinatorial auctions with demand/supply function bids. Our
auction setting is then described in details that will be solved in chapter 3 and 4. It also
gives an extensive review of existing work in auction clearing. Second, it explains the
problem of task distribution within VOs, formalises the problem of coalition structure
generation that will be solved in chapter 5, and gives a literature review of the area.
Chapter 3 presents polynomial clearing algorithms that are applicable for a broad class of
bidding function that satisﬁes discount and free disposal properties. First, it presents the
algorithms for multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial cases. The algorithms
are proved to generate solution that is within a ﬁnite bound of the optimal. Second, it
presents our benchmark test and the empirical results reveal that in realistic settings,
the bound of the optimal can be even smaller than that in the theoretical worst-case
analysis.
In contrast to chapter 3, chapter 4 presents optimal clearing algorithms that are guar-
anteed to produce the optimal allocation, but which are not polynomial. Two sets of
algorithm are presented for two broad classes of bidding functions: piece-wise linear and
one-unit-diﬀerence.
Chapter 5 presents our novel coalition structure generation that can be disrupted any-
time and is guaranteed to produce solutions that are within a ﬁnite bound of the optimal
(the longer we run the algorithm, the smaller the bound is). It is then benchmarked
against the only other algorithm by [Sandholm et al., 1999] that is also guaranteed to
produce solutions that are within a ﬁnite bound of the optimal. The benchmark results
shows that our algorithm to be considerably faster than its alternative.
Finally, chapter 6 concludes and presents future work.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter gives an introduction and a literature review on the area of virtual organi-
sations. In particular, this review focuses on the main problems that we are tackling in
this thesis; namely partner selection and task distribution in VOs. Speciﬁcally, section
2.1 outlines the main research issues in VOs in general and gives a detailed analysis of
some of the main existing projects on VOs. Section 2.2 then focuses on the problem
of partner selection in VOs. It discusses, in detail, the use of auctions to solve this
problem and explains the need for clearing algorithms for combinatorial auctions with
demand/supply function bids. The state of the art of this area is then analysed and the
shortcomings against our requirements are identiﬁed. Section 2.3 follows by focusing on
the problem of task distribution within VOs, and formalises the problem of coalition
structure generation that will be solved in chapter 5. Here, again, the existing litera-
ture in this area is reviewed and the shortcomings with respect to our requirements are
identiﬁed.
2.1 Virtual Organisations
As noted in chapter 1, virtual organisations (VOs) are becoming an ever more important
research area because they oﬀer a number of potential advantages over the independent
organisation and traditional collaborative models. However, there are still a number
of key research challenges that need to be overcome in order to make the VO vision a
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practical reality. The challenges, discussed below, can be organised according to the VO
lifecycle (as per ﬁgure 1.1).
• Creation phase: in which one or more of the entities comes to believe that it
might be worthwhile to create a VO. This agent contacts a number of potential
participants to determine whether they would be willing to join the VO, and, if it
is successful, this will establish a group of agents that are willing to work together
in the context of the VO. The main issues in the creation phase are:
– Identiﬁcation of needs: the VO initiator needs to be able to identify the
task the VO will be doing, decompose the task, then identify the skills and
capacities needed from members of the planned VO.
– Enterprise capability representation: agent capabilities (descriptions of the
services that each agent provides) need to be well-deﬁned using some rich rep-
resentation and standardised to support inter-operability that facilitates the
activities of searching for partners. Speciﬁcally, partners need to be search-
able based on multiple attributes such as the services that they provide, their
geography of operation, and the quality of service they provide. This is nec-
essary as the VO initiator may not only look for companies that provide
speciﬁc services, but may also need to know the quality of the services that
they provide, as well as their geography of operation, to ensure the success
of the future VO.
– Partner selection mechanism: the mechanism to select from among the candi-
dates those that will be the most appropriate ones to actually form the VO. In
this context, the most appropriate could be the ones who can provide speciﬁc
services with the lowest costs, the highest quality, or the greatest reliability.
• Operation phase: in which the tasks that need to be carried out are determined
and it is decided which members of the VO will be responsible for which of these
various tasks. Here the key issues are:
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– Task distribution mechanism: the means by which the ﬂow of incoming tasks
are assigned to the members of the VO in order to maximise the eﬃciency of
the overall collective.
– VO partners collaboration support tools: the tools that facilitate the collab-
orative activities between the members of the VO, for example, secure data
exchange and data sharing, group planning and scheduling, and other VO
management tools.
• Maintenance phase: in which the VO structure (in terms of its members or the
task distribution) needs to be changed because of member failure or changes in the
environment. The main issues in this phase are how to add new members into the
VO and how to distribute or redistribute the necessary tasks between the members
of the new structure. The former case is similar to the partner selection mechanism
part of the creation phase (but not identical to it, as here we don’t want to build
the VO from scratch, but rather build on what is already there), while the latter
case is similar to the task distribution mechanism part of the operation phase.
• Dissolution phase: in which the VO is disbanded because it is no longer eﬀective.
Here the main issues relate to how the VO’s performance is measured and assessed,
the mechanism that is put in place to enable the collective to disband and to absolve
itself of any remaining commitments.
While a number of projects have now started in this area, each tends to deal with a
speciﬁc aspect of the VO lifecycle. Moreover, in many of the existing projects, the
degree of automation of the VO lifecycle is limited.
For example, the NIIIP project (National Industrial Information Infrastructure Proto-
cols) [NIIIP, 1998] and the PRODNET II project [Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh,
1999] are concerned with the development of IT and cooperation platforms for VOs.
The former was developed by the NIIIP Consortium [NIIIP, 1998] which is a U.S. In-
dustry/Government initiative to develop a software technology that will enable Virtual
Enterprise Computing. Speciﬁcally, it exploits core technologies deﬁned by: Internet and
related communications facilities and services; the Object Management Group (OMG)1
1Object Management Group, http://www.omg.org.
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and related object technology; and The Standard for the Exchange of Product Model
Data (STEP) 2 and related information modelling technologies, and develops additional
technology to integrate these technologies for work and knowledge management of VEs.
The three main areas that it concerns are: communication (based on Internet and object
technology by OMG), data and information exchange (based on STEP) and knowledge
and task management (based on work by the Workﬂow Management Coalition (WfMC)).
As such, it lacks any signiﬁcant degree of automation in any of the key phases of the
VO lifecycle.
PRODNET II, on the other hand, aims to develop an open and highly ﬂexible support
infrastructure for virtual enterprises that is particularly suited to the needs of small and
medium enterprises (SMEs). PRODNET II’s basic platform facilitates the exchange of
commercial data (EDIFACT), the exchange of technical product data (STEP), order
status monitoring, quality related information exchange and information management
supporting administrative information about the virtual enterprise. It also incorporates
a coordination module that handles all cooperation related events (execution of a local
work ﬂow), a component that allows the deﬁnition and parametrization of the virtual
enterprise and the behaviour of each particular enterprise and a component that manages
incompletely and imprecisely speciﬁed orders (along their life cycle). Within this project,
the main supported phases in the VO lifecycle are creation and operation. In the former
case, the project utilises private supplier lists or some public directories to search for
potential partners. In the latter case, the project develops coordination and workﬂow
management tools that help the VO members to cooperate eﬀectively. Thus, it also
lacks a signiﬁcant degree of automation in partner selection and task distribution of the
VO.
Other projects in this area tend to address particular aspects in a speciﬁc phase of
the lifecycle. For example, AVE (Agents in Virtual Enterprises) [Fischer et al., 1996]
concentrates on using agents in the formation of a VO (creation phase). In particular, the
project uses auctions mechanism to form the VO. However, it uses only simple auction
mechanisms (such as English, Dutch, ﬁrst-price sealed bid and second-price sealed-bid
2The Standard for the Exchange of Product Model Data (STEP), ISO 10303, http://www.nist.gov.
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auctions) and so cannot allow the potential partners to vary their potential involvement
in the VO, and thus, may not be able to select the most suitable set of partners either.
MASSYVE (Multiagent Manufacturing Agile Scheduling Systems for Virtual Enter-
prises) [Rabelo et al., 1998] focuses on agile scheduling (the operation phase). In partic-
ular, it addresses task distribution by using software agents that utilise the Contract Net
Protocol 3 to assign tasks among agents. Speciﬁcally, the procedure is to announce a task
(an enterprise activity) through the MAS network and then make the agents exchange
information about it with other agents until one of them is selected to perform the task.
However, this approach only deals with distributing one task at a time. Thus it is likely
to be slow when multiple such tasks need to be assigned. Moreover, such sequential
allocation may lead to sub-optimal outcomes because it ignores the inter-dependencies
that may almost invariably exist between tasks.
Following a related approach, [Rocha and Oliveira, 1999] develop a system in which a
market agent (VO broker) sends invitations to the potential partners corresponding to
each of the VO’s sub-tasks. Interested enterprise agents then formulate bids according
to their own capabilities and send bids back to the VO broker. The market agent then
uses a multi-criteria function to evaluate bids, and uses constraint satisfaction techniques
to resolve any incompatibility between them. However, bids are made for each of the
sub-tasks, thus this approach cannot take into account any relationship/interdependence
that may exist between the sub-tasks. In [Daviddrajuh and Deng, 2000], mobile agents
are sent by the VO creator to collect data from potential partners. Then an assessment
on the potential partners about their suitability to the prospective VO is made, based
on the collected data. However, there is a clear question made about whether potential
partners will expose their true private information to the VO creator’s mobile agents.
The VEGA project [Stephens, 1999] develops an information infrastructure to support
the technical and business operations of VOs using groupware tools and distributed
architectures (the operation phase). Speciﬁcally, the VEGA platform supports people
in information sharing (data exchange, distributed user access, distributed database,
3FIPA Contract Net Interaction Protocol Speciﬁcation: http://www.ﬁpa.org/specs/ﬁpa00029/.
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concurrent user access) and managing group activity. However, it does not provide an
automated task distribution mechanism.
As can be seen, these projects typically provide tools to support diﬀerent aspects of the
VO lifecycle. However, they rarely provide eﬃcient mechanisms to automate the various
phases. This is particularly true when it comes to partner selection mechanisms in the
creation phase, task distribution in the operation phase and adding/removing partners
and task redistribution in the maintenance phase. Given this, this thesis seeks to start
addressing this shortcoming by developing eﬃcient mechanisms for partner selection and
task distribution in VOs. The next two sections will detail our approach in solving these
problems. Speciﬁcally, section 2.2 focuses on the problem of partner selection, while
section 2.3 concentrates on the problem of task distribution.
2.2 Partner Selection in Virtual Organisations
As discussed earlier, it was decided that this research will use combinatorial auctions to
tackle the partner selection problem (the reasons and rationale for this choice are given
in subsection 1.2.1). Speciﬁcally, this means that an agent, after detecting a market
opportunity (niche), will determine the capabilities or services that need to be present
in order to deliver the functionality of the new virtual organisation. This agent will
then send out requests for proposals to all interested parties, who will reply with bids
indicating the services and associated capacities they are willing to oﬀer. The initiating
agent (acting as the auctioneer) will then use the clearing algorithms to determine the
best set of agents, services and capacities to constitute the new virtual organisation.
Here best can be most eﬃcient, lowest cost, or best quality. A similar method can then
also be used in the maintenance phase for adding new members to the VO. The diﬀerence
is that in this case the requests for proposals only concern the additional services and/or
capacities needed. For more detail, see chapter 6 where the techniques developed in this
thesis for partner selection are applied into a concrete scenario.
However, existing clearing algorithms cannot be taken oﬀ-the-shelf for this problem
because they only consider atomic proposition bids (that is, bids are either accepted
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in their entirety or rejected) (see subsection 2.2.2 for more details). This, in turn, has
the disadvantage of limiting the choice, and hence the potential proﬁt, available to the
auctioneer. For example, consider the case where there are only two bids: x1 units of
one good at price p1 and x2 units at price p2, and the auctioneer wants to trade less
than x1 + x2 units of the good. In this case, the auctioneer has no choice other than
selecting one or other of the two bids. This may prevent the auctioneer from maximising
its payoﬀ. For example, the auctioneer may ﬁnd it more beneﬁcial to accept both bids
partially; that is, trade y1 (y1 < x1) units with bidder 1 at price y1x1 · p1 and trade y2
(y2 < x2) units with bidder 2 at price y2x2 · p2.
Moreover, if the bids are expressed in terms of the correlation between the quantity of
items and the price (rather than the simple linear extrapolation above4), there will be
even more choice for the auctioneer, and, consequently, even more chance of maximising
its payoﬀ. When viewed from the bidder’s perspective, the atomic nature of bids and the
inability to explicitly relate price and quantity means that opportunities for trade are
lost because the auctioneer may not want the entire package being oﬀered, even though
elements of it may be acceptable. Although nearly all the aforementioned work permits
XOR (exclusive-or) bids5, and, in theory, the correlation function between the quantity
and the price may be expressed using XOR atomic proposition bids to specify points;
in practice, it is nearly impossible as the number of points on the graph of the function
could be exponential. For example, let us suppose a bidder wants to trade 1000 units
with unit price 10 if the quantity is less than 100, and with unit price 9 if the quantity
is in the range between 100 and 1000. With XOR bidding, the bid has to be expressed
as XOR of 1000 atomic proposition bids, in which each atomic bid is a pair of quantity
and price for every quantity from 1 to 1000. This is clearly ineﬃcient.
To overcome the aforementioned shortcomings associated with atomic propositions,
Sandholm and Suri consider the case in which agents can submit bids that correspond
4In many cases, linear extrapolation does not work because bidders may value bundles of items
non-linearly.
5An XOR bid is one in which a bidder submit an arbitrary number of atomic proposition bids with
the condition that it is willing to obtain at most one of these bids [Sandholm, 1999]. For an overview
on atomic-related bidding languages see [Nisan, 2000].
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to a demand or supply curve depending on whether it is an auction or a reverse auction6
respectively [Sandholm and Suri, 2001]. Thus, bids are expressed in terms of a curve
which correlates the quantity with the price of an item. For example, an agent may
express the bid as q = 2 ∗ p + 1, which means that the agent is willing to trade up to
q = 2 ∗ p + 1 units if the unit price equals p.7 Unfortunately, their work is limited to
multi-unit single-item auctions8 and does not deal with the combinatorial case. This
means their algorithm cannot explicitly cope with any interdependencies that may exist
between the purchasing of multiple items.
In the next two chapters, we develop clearing algorithms for both forward and reverse
auctions that remove the shortcomings associated with the atomic proposition nature of
previous combinatorial clearing algorithms and the non-combinatorial nature of Sand-
holm and Suri’s demand/supply curve functions. Speciﬁcally, we consider multi-unit
single-item and multi-unit combinatorial forward auctions and reverse auctions in which
bids contain an agent’s demand/supply function. This is necessary when applying auc-
tions to VO creation as the expressiveness of auctions with demand/supply function
bids and the potential beneﬁt they bring make them highly suitable for VO eﬃcient
formation. To this end, the next subsection formalises the problem of clearing auctions
with demand/supply function bids, before subsection 2.2.2 analyses the state of the art
in this area in more detail.
2.2.1 Auction Clearing with Demand/Supply Function Bids
This subsection formalises the problem of clearing in multi-unit combinatorial forward
(reverse) auctions. Assume there are m items (goods/services): 1, 2, ...,m and n bidders
a1, a2, ..., an. The auctioneer has a supply (demand) (q1, q2, ..., qm), in which qj is the
quantity of item j that the auctioneer is willing to sell (buy).9 Let uji be the maximum
6In an auction (forward auction), there is one seller and multiple buyers; while in a reverse auction,
there is one buyer and multiple sellers.
7Their price function calculates the quantity from the unit price. However, in our work, the price
function will calculate the unit price from the quantity, because we ﬁnd the later more natural.
8By single item we mean that there is only one type of good/service for trading in the auction.
9In the remainder of this thesis, when describing forward and reverse auctions, the ﬁrst word deals
with the forward case and the word in brackets applies to the reverse case. But since both cases are not
simply the inverse of one another in general way, sometimes we need to show things separately for the
forward and for the reverse case.
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quantity of item j that ai is able or willing to buy (sell) (if ai is not willing to buy (sell)
an item j, then uji = 0). Let N be the set of natural numbers and Q
∗ be the set of
non-negative rational numbers.
The demand (supply) function is the price function of the items that each bidder is
willing to buy (sell). The demand (supply) function of bidder i is:
Pi : (N ∩ [1, u1i ])× (N ∩ [1, u2i ])× ...× (N ∩ [1, umi ]) → Q∗
where Pi(r1, r2, .., rm) is the price oﬀered by bidder i for the package of items (r1, r2,
..., rm) and rj is the quantity of item j, rj ∈ N, 0 ≤ rj ≤ uji , ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ m. For example,
suppose that m = 3, then P1(1, 3, 2) will be the price agent 1 oﬀers for a package which
is composed of 1 unit of item 1, 3 units of item 2 and 2 units of item 3 altogether. In the
single-item case, the graph of a demand (supply) function will be a curve (ﬁgure 2.1),
while in the combinatorial case, it will be a surface (ﬁgure 2.2).
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Figure 2.1: A demand (supply) curve for multi-unit single-item case.
Having determined the demand function, we now consider the supply allocation which
is the amount that the auctioneer trades with each bidder.
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Figure 2.2: A demand (supply) function for multi-unit combinatorial case.
Definition 2.1. A supply allocation is a tuple 〈rji 〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that the
auctioneer sells (buys) rji units of item j to (from) each agent ai.
10
Given the deﬁnitions of the demand (supply) function and the supply allocation, the
problem of forward (reverse) auction clearing is then to ﬁnd a supply allocation 〈αji 〉, 1 ≤
i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m that:
• Satisﬁes the supply (demand) constraint
n∑
i=1
αji ≤ qj, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m (forward case) (2.1)
n∑
i=1
αji ≥ qj, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m (reverse case) (2.2)
That is, the quantity of each item that the auctioneer sells (buys) to (from) all
bidders is not bigger (less) than the auctioneer’s supply (demand) for that item.
10Because the auctioneer sells (buys) items at the price that the bidders oﬀer, it may well be the case
that the auctioneer will sell (buy) the same package from two diﬀerent bidders at diﬀerent prices. That
is, the auctions have discriminatory pricing [Sandholm and Suri, 2001].
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• Optimise the auctioneer’s total revenue:
n∑
i=1
Pi(α1i , α
2
i , ..., α
m
i ) is maximal (minimal). (2.3)
That is, the total price of all the units of all the items supplied by the auctioneer
(bidders) should be as big (small) as possible.
However, the auction clearing problem has been shown to be NP-complete, even for
the simpliﬁed case of single-items with piecewise linear supply curves [Sandholm and
Suri, 2001] 11. Thus, it is impossible to ﬁnd a polynomial algorithm whose solution is
guaranteed to be the optimal allocation, unless P = NP.
2.2.2 The State of The Art in Clearing Algorithms
As stated in subsection 2.2.1, most of the previous work on clearing algorithms for
combinatorial auctions has been based on atomic proposition auctions. In particular,
Sandholm et al. have categorised and analysed the complexity of various kinds of atomic
proposition types (e.g. auctions, reverse auctions, and exchanges, which are then cat-
egorised as single or multiple units, with or without free disposal) [Sandholm et al.,
2002]. In this line of work, they showed that clearing combinatorial atomic proposition
auctions is NP-complete, even for the case of single-units. Thus, heuristic methods are
typically used to tackle this problem.
In more detail, Nisan used Linear Programming to investigate the single-unit combina-
torial case [Nisan, 2000]. He showed that Linear Programming can produce the optimal
solution in a reasonable time in some speciﬁc cases (e.g. linear order bids12, mutual
11The proof of NP-completeness in [Sandholm and Suri, 2001] is not directly applicable to our speciﬁc
auction setting in chapter 3 (because the demand/supply function in their proof is not compatible with
this setting). Thus we will present a proof of NP-completeness for our speciﬁc setting in chapter 3.
Their proof, however, can be applied to our auction settings in chapter 4 (because in this case, the
demand/supply function in their proof is compatible with our setting).
12This means the set of items can be linearly ordered G = {g1...gn} such that all bids S are for a
consecutive sub-range S = {gk...gl} of items [Rothkopf et al., 1998].
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exclusion bids13 and substructure bids.14) He then suggested using greedy and Branch-
and-Bound algorithms based on Linear Programming for the other cases. His greedy
algorithm is computationally eﬃcient (polynomial complexity), but cannot guarantee to
produce the optimal solution, while his Branch-and-Bound algorithm provably produces
the optimal solution, but cannot guarantee to run in polynomial time.
Other researchers such as Gonen and Lehmann and Leyton Brown et al. have further
investigated the use of Branch-and-Bound techniques to solve the clearing problem [Go-
nen and Lehmann, 2000] [Leyton-Brown et al., 2000]. Both of their algorithms build up
a partial allocation one bid at a time, while using a depth-ﬁrst search with backtracking
to cover the whole search space. Although these Branch-and-Bound algorithms cannot
guarantee to produce the optimal solution in polynomial time, they presented various
methods to speed up the algorithms. In more detail, Leyton Brown et al. designed a
function for computing upper bounds for the optimal outcome, tailored speciﬁcally to
the multi-unit combinatorial auction problem. Dynamic programming techniques, tech-
niques for pre-processing and caching, and heuristics for determining search orderings
are also used to further improve their algorithm. Gonen and Lehmann discussed various
methods of bounding from above (linear programming, projections, average price con-
sideration) and for choosing the most promising bid (ordering the bids by price, average
unit price, normalised average unit price) [Gonen and Lehmann, 2000].
However, as stated above, all of the above work has been based on atomic proposi-
tion auctions. So by removing this restriction, our algorithms produce more eﬃcient
allocations.
In contrast to the above, however, [Sandholm and Suri, 2001] considered multi-unit
single-item auctions with bids in the form of supply/demand curves. By limiting these
curves to a speciﬁc type (linear and piecewise linear curves15), they were able to analyse
13This means the bid is presented in the OR-of-XORs language, where each atomic bid is for a singleton
set [Nisan, 2000].
14This means the auction is a “sum” of other auctions for which Linear Programming can produce
optimal solutions.
15Their concepts of linear and piecewise linear curves are diﬀerent from ours, as they consider the unit
price function, not the total price function. Thus, when they speak of a linear unit price function, this
means a quadratic total price function.
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the complexity and suggest an algorithm for clearing.16 However, as discussed in section
2.2, this work does not deal with the multi-unit combinatorial case.
Other researchers such as Davenport et al. and Eso et al. have further considered multi-
unit combinatorial reverse auctions with supply curves [Davenport and Kalagnanam,
2001] [Eso et al., 2001]. They showed that in the case where the supply curves are
piecewise linear, the clearing problem can be modeled as a Linear Program and solved
using Linear Programming techniques. However, in this work, bidders submit separate
supply curves for diﬀerent items, and it is assumed that the price of a package of items is
equal to the sum of all the prices of the separate items.17 This means that these auctions
are not truly combinatorial in nature as the correlation between items is ignored.
2.3 Task Distribution within Virtual Organisations
In this thesis, the problem of task distribution within virtual organisations is tackled
using coalition formation techniques developed in the ﬁeld of multi-agent systems (see
section 2.3.2 for a review of the state of the art in this area). Now, in this context, the
coalition formation process can be viewed as being composed of three main activities
[Sandholm et al., 1999]:
1. Coalition structure generation: forming coalitions of agents such that those within
a coalition coordinate their activities, but those in diﬀerent coalitions do not. This
primarily involves partitioning the set of all agents in the system into exhaustive
and disjoint coalitions.18 Such a partition is called a coalition structure. For
example, in a multi-agent system composed of three agents {a1, a2, a3}, there exist
seven possible coalitions:
{a1}
{a2}
{a3}
{a1, a2}
16They provided an algorithm for the linear case only, not for the piecewise linear case.
17This property is called additive separability in [Eso et al., 2001].
18Some research also considers non-disjoint coalitions (see subsection 2.3.2 for details).
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{a1, a3}
{a2, a3}
{a1, a2, a3}
and ﬁve possible coalition structures:
{{a1, a2, a3}}
{{a1}, {a2, a3}}
{{a2}, {a3, a1}}
{{a3}, {a1, a2}} {{a1}, {a2}, {a3}}.
2. Optimising the value of each coalition: pooling the resources and tasks of the
agents in a given coalition to maximise the coalition value. For example, given the
coalition structure {{a1}, {a2, a3}}, each of the two coalitions {a1} and {a2, a3}
will try to optimise its value.
3. Payoﬀ distribution: dividing each coalition’s value among its members. For ex-
ample, if the coalition {a2, a3} produces a payoﬀ of X then this value needs to be
divided between a2 and a3 according to some scheme (e.g. equality or stability).
Although these activities are distinct and, in a sense, conceptually sequential, it is also
clear that they interact. For example, in a competitive environment, the coalition that
an agent wants to join depends on the payoﬀ that it is likely to receive (activities 1 and 3).
However, in cooperative environments, where the agents work together to maximise the
social welfare, payoﬀ distribution is less important, and coalition structure generation
that maximises the social welfare is the dominant concern. In the context of this work,
the VO operation phase can be considered a cooperative environment because once the
members of the VO are established, their aim is to work together to maximise the payoﬀ
of the VO as a whole. Thus, the focus of this thesis is in developing new algorithms for
coalition structure generation.
Classically, game theoretic work on coalition formation is mainly concerned with coali-
tion structure generation and payoﬀ distribution [Rapoport and Kahan, 1984]. However,
it is static in nature, and while it addresses the question of which coalition structure
should form, it does not address the question of how to generate the coalition structure
that maximises the social welfare.
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Much work on coalition formation considers super-additive environments (meaning any
two disjoint coalitions are better oﬀ by merging together) [Ketchpel, 1994] [Rapoport
and Kahan, 1984] [Shehory and Kraus, 1995] [Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1994]. In such
cases, coalition structure generation is trivial because all agents are better oﬀ by forming
the grand coalition (i.e. the coalition that contains all the agents). Moreover, it has
even been argued that almost all environments are super-additive because, at worst, the
agents in the composite coalition can use solutions as if they are in separate coalitions
[Rapoport and Kahan, 1984]. However, this assumption is not valid for many real-world
problems, including those that drive our work, because of the cost of forming coalitions
and the cost of coordination between members in the same coalition.
In non-super-additive environments, coalition structure generation is a major concern
(because of the exponential size of the set of all possible coalition structures). In such
cases, the desirable goal is usually to maximise the social welfare. However, it has been
shown that this problem is NP-hard and, moreover, even ﬁnding a sub-optimal solution
requires searching an exponential number of solutions [Sandholm et al., 1999]. To tackle
this problem, several researchers have proposed algorithms for coalition structure gen-
eration. However, most of the existing algorithms cannot establish a worst-case bound
from the optimal. This is clearly undesirable because it means the solutions they gen-
erate can be arbitrarily bad. To overcome this drawback, Sandholm et al. developed
an anytime algorithm that can establish a worst-case bound (until our algorithm it was
the only one that could do this) [Sandholm et al., 1999]. However, as their algorithm’s
computational complexity is exponential, it is desirable to see if its complexity can be
reduced in order to make it usable in practical applications. Speciﬁcally, reducing its
complexity is essential if it is to be applicable in the VO operation phase.
Against this background, chapter 5 will develop a novel coalition structure generation
algorithm that is shown to be signiﬁcantly faster than its alternative in our benchmark
tests (for an example of the algorithm’s application in VO task distribution, see chapter 6
where the algorithm is applied into a concrete scenario). To this end, the next subsection
formalises the problem of coalition structure generation.
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2.3.1 Coalition Structure Generation
This subsection formalises the problem of coalition structure generation. Let A be the set
of agents, and n be the number of agents in A (i.e., |A| = n). As is common practice in
the literature (e.g. [Ketchpel, 1994] [Rapoport and Kahan, 1984] [Sandholm et al., 1999]
[Shehory and Kraus, 1996]), we consider coalition formation in characteristic function
games (CFGs). In such settings, there is a value v(S) for each and every subset S of
A, known as the value of coalition S, which is the utility that members of S can jointly
attain. Fundamentally, this means each coalition’s value is independent of the actions
of agents that are not members of the coalition. Although, in general, the value of a
coalition may depend on non-members’ actions, CFGs can be applied in many real-world
multi-agent problems [Sandholm et al., 1999].
As in [Sandholm et al., 1999], we assume that every coalition’s value is non-negative:
v(S) ≥ 0,∀S ⊆ A (2.4)
This assumption is not very restrictive, because if there exist some negative coalitional
values, and if all coalitional values are bound from below (i.e., they are not inﬁnitely
negative), they can always be normalised by subtracting from each of them a value
minS⊆A v(S).
A coalition structure CS is a partition of A into disjoint, exhaustive coalitions. That is,
each agent belongs to exactly one coalition. The value of a coalition structure, V (CS),
is expressed in terms of its social welfare. That is:
V (CS) =
∑
S∈CS
v(S) (2.5)
Also, we deﬁne the size of a coalition structure as the number of coalitions that it
contains and L as the set of all coalition structures.
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Given the above terms, the problem of coalition structure generation is then to ﬁnd a
coalition structure CS∗ that maximises the social welfare. That is:
CS∗ = argmaxcs∈LV (CS) (2.6)
However, the problem of coalition structure generation is computationally complex.
Sandholm et al. [Sandholm et al., 1999] showed that the number of coalition structures
(i.e. |L|) is exponential, speciﬁcally, O(nn) and ω(nn/2), and that the problem is NP-
hard. Moreover, they showed that for any algorithm to establish any bound from the
optimal, it must search at least 2n−1 coalition structures.
2.3.2 The State of The Art in Coalition Formation
As mentioned above, most of the existing work in coalition formation in game theory
[Rapoport and Kahan, 1984] has focused on coalition structure generation and payoﬀ
distribution. In this context, many solutions have been proposed based on diﬀerent
stability concepts (e.g. the core, the Shapley value, the kernel, the stable set, and
the bargaining set). Transfer schemes have also been developed to transfer non-stable
payoﬀ distributions to stable ones (while keeping the coalition structure unchanged) (e.g.
transfer schemes have been developed for the bargaining set and the kernel).19
Recently, however, researchers in multi-agent systems have paid more attention to the
problem of coalition structure generation. As mentioned above, [Sandholm et al., 1999]
developed an anytime algorithm that guarantees to produce solutions within a ﬁnite
bound from the optimal. However, as we will demonstrate in chapter 5, this algorithm is
signiﬁcantly slower than ours. On the other hand, [Shehory and Kraus, 1998] consider a
somewhat broader environment, where the coalitions can overlap. In this work, however,
they reduce the complexity of the problem by limiting the size of the coalitions. They
then develop a greedy algorithm that guarantees to produce a solution that is within a
bound from the best solution possible given the limit on the number of agents. However,
19For a comprehensive review on stability concepts and transfer schemes in game theory, see [Rapoport
and Kahan, 1984].
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this best solution can be arbitrarily far from the actual optimal solution (without the
limit on the size of the coalitions).
Some other researchers address both coalition structure generation and payoﬀ distri-
bution in competitive environments. Speciﬁcally, [Ketchpel, 1994] presents a coalition
formation method with cubic running time in the number of agents, but his method
can neither guarantee a bound from the optimal nor stability. Shehory and Kraus’s
protocol guarantees that if the agents follow it, a certain stability (kernel-stability) is
met [Shehory and Kraus, 1996]. In the same paper, they also present an alternative
protocol that oﬀers a weaker form of stability with polynomial running time. However,
in both cases, no bound from the optimal is guaranteed.
More recent research in coalition formation area has also begun to pay attention to
dynamic environments, where agents may enter or leave the coalition formation process
and many uncertainties are present (e.g. the coalition value is not ﬁxed, but it is
context-based [Klusch and Gerber, 2002]). However, to date, no algorithm with bound
guarantees has been developed for this environment.
2.4 Summary
This chapter has outlined the background for the problems that will be addressed in
the remainder of this thesis. Speciﬁcally, it gives a literature review on the general
area of virtual organisations, as well as formalising the problems of auction clearing and
coalition structure generation. It also highlights the need to develop new algorithms
for both of these problems so that the ensuing solutions can be made applicable to
partner selection and task distribution within VOs. Against this background, the next
three chapters will present our algorithms for these problems. Speciﬁcally, chapter 3
presents our novel polynomial algorithms for clearing multi-unit combinatorial auctions,
while chapter 4 presents our optimal algorithms for clearing multi-unit combinatorial
auctions. Finally, chapter 5 details our novel coalition structure generation algorithm.
Chapter 6 then follows to draw the algorithms developed in these three chapters together
by demonstrating how they can be applied in a VO lifecycle in a scenario.
Chapter 3
Polynomial Auction Clearing
Algorithms
This chapter develops polynomial algorithms for clearing multi-unit single-item and
multi-unit combinatorial forward and reverse auctions 1. Speciﬁcally, we consider set-
tings where bidders submit their bids in the form of a demand/supply function and the
auctions have sub-additive pricing with free disposal. The algorithms are based on a
greedy strategy and they are shown to be of polynomial complexity. Furthermore, the
solutions they generate are shown to be within a ﬁnite bound of the optimal.
In more detail, we consider settings where the price function satisﬁes two properties:
• Discount: ∀ 0 ≤ rj, sj ≤ uji ,
Pi(r1 + s1, r2 + s2, ..., rm + sm)
≤ Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm) + Pi(s1, s2, ..., sm) (3.1)
That is, the price of any combination of two packages altogether is always cheaper
than or equal to the price of these two bundles separately. For example, buying
10 units of item 1 and 12 units of item 2 is always cheaper than buying 5 units of
1Forward and reverse auctions are not simply the converse of each other in this context; they have
diﬀerent properties and so require diﬀerent proofs.
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item 1 and 6 units of item 2 twice. In game-theoretic terms, this property is also
called sub-additive [Tennenholtz, 2000].
• Free Disposal: if ∀ j : 0 ≤ rj ≤ sj ≤ uji , then:
Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm) ≤ Pi(s1, s2, ..., sm) (3.2)
That is, if one package has no fewer units of each item than another package, the
former is not less expensive than the latter. For example, 10 units of item 1 and
20 units of item 2 is always cheaper than 15 units of item 1 and 25 units of item 2.
The above assumptions are needed for the subsequent analysis of our algorithms and,
moreover, we believe they are applicable to a wide range of applications. The free
disposal property is a standard assumption that is adopted in most of the aforementioned
work on auction clearing (section 2.2). The sub-additivity assumption is less frequently
used but, we believe, is still reasonable in many situations. In particular, in our VO
scenario, this would mean, for example, the price of a package of movies and news
provided by a media provider is cheaper or equal to the total price of the two equivalent
packages being provided separately by the same media provider. Thus, their adoption
does not signiﬁcantly limit the scope of our results.2
To this end, section 3.1 presents our algorithm for the single-item case (i.e. where
m = 1), including the proof of NP-completeness of the clearing problem. Then we
will deal with the combinatorial case as a generalisation in section 3.2. Section 3.3 will
present our benchmark test of the algorithms provided. This empirical results show that
for the cases we considered, the bounds from the optimal of our algorithms’ solutions
are considerably smaller than the theoretical results proved in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
2There are domains where these assumptions do not hold, for example, in nuclear electric industry,
where it is costly to dump nuclear waste away.
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3.1 Multi-Unit Single-Item Auctions
This section will ﬁrst present the proof of NP-completeness of the problem of clearing
forward and reverse multi-unit single-item auction with the free disposal and the discount
properties (subsection 3.1.1). Then it will present our clearing algorithms and analyse
their properties.
3.1.1 Proof of NP-completeness
Using the notation of the previous section, the multi-unit single-item forward (reverse)
auction case can be formulated as follows: Let n be the number of bidders. Let q be the
supply (demand) of the auctioneer and ui be the maximum quantity of the item that ai
is willing to buy (sell). The demand (supply) function (in the single-item case it can be
drawn as a curve, so we can call it the demand (supply) curve) is the price function of
the item:
Pi : N ∩ [1, ui] → Q∗
where N and Q∗ are the sets of natural numbers and non-negative rational numbers,
respectively, and Pi(r) is the price bidder i oﬀers for r units altogether.
For mathematical convenience, in this subsection we will use the unit price function
instead of the price function. The unit price function for each bidder i is:
pi : N ∩ [1, ui] → Q∗
where pi(r) is the unit price bidder i oﬀers for r units altogether. That is,
pi(r) =
Pi(r)
r
As before, we consider settings where the demand (supply) curve satisﬁes the following
properties:
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• Discount (the more units that are sold, the less the unit price is):
pi(r) ≥ pi(s),∀ 0 ≤ r ≤ s ≤ ui (3.3)
• Free Disposal (the more units of the item that are sold, the more the total price
is):
r · pi(r) ≤ s · pi(s),∀ 0 ≤ r ≤ s ≤ ui (3.4)
The clearing problem is then one of ﬁnding a supply allocation 〈αi〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i.e., the
auctioneer will sell (buy) αi units to (from) agent ai, such that:
• The quantities the auctioneer sells (buys) to the bidders satisfy the supply (de-
mand) constraint:
n∑
i=1
αi ≤ q (forward case) (3.5)
n∑
i=1
αi ≥ q (reverse case) (3.6)
• Optimise the auctioneer’s total revenue:
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi) is maximal (minimal). (3.7)
This is an optimization problem. Thus, in order to analyse the complexity according to
NP-completeness, we need to convert it into a decision problem. The decision problem
is, given a set of bids and the auctioneer’s supply (demand), is there a supply allocation
that will give the auctioneer a revenue exceeding a certain value?
First of all, we show that the clearing problem is NP-complete.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a multi-unit single-item auction with free disposal and discount
bidding functions. Then the problem of clearing the auction is NP-complete, even for
the simple case when the bidding function is composed of linear segments (i.e. piece-wise
linear).
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Proof. First of all, it is trivial that the problem is in NP, because given a supply allo-
cation, we can calculate the revenue it gives the auctioneer in polynomial time. Thus
we just need to show that the problem is NP-hard which we do by reducing it to the
knapsack problem (as in [Sandholm and Suri, 2001]).
[Forward auction case]
As in [Sandholm and Suri, 2001], we reduce the knapsack problem [Martello and Toth,
1990] to our auction problem.
Let {(s1, v1), (s2, v2), ..., (sn, vn), c} be an instance of the knapsack problem, that is, c
is the knapsack capacity, si and vi are the size and the value of item i, respectively.
We then create an instance of the multi-unit single-item auction with free disposal and
discount bidding functions as follows.
Let the supply of the auctioneer be: q = n + c.
Let the maximum quantity that bidder i is willing to trade be: ui = si + 1.
Let K be a number such that K satisﬁes the two following inequations:
K > max
1≤i,j≤n,i=j
vi/vj (3.8)
K > max
1≤i≤n
si (3.9)
Then, let the price function of bidder i be:


Pi(r) = K ∗ vi, ∀1 ≤ r ≤ si
Pi(ui) = (K + 1) ∗ vi
With the above deﬁnitions, we can show that these price functions satisfy both the
discount and the free disposal property:
• Discount: As we have pi(r) = K ∗ vi/r for all 1 ≤ r ≤ si, we just need to show
that pi(si) ≥ pi(si + 1).
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We have:
pi(si + 1) = (K + 1) ∗ vi/(si + 1)
⇒ pi(si + 1)
pi(si)
=
(K + 1) ∗ vi/(si + 1)
K ∗ vi/si
⇒ pi(si + 1)
pi(si)
=
Ksi + si
Ksi + K
⇒ pi(si + 1)
pi(si)
< 1 (because of (3.8))
⇒ pi(si + 1) < pi(si)
• Free Disposal: it is trivial that Pi(r) satisﬁes the free disposal property.
The goal of the clearing algorithm is then to ﬁnd a supply allocation 〈αi〉 such that:
• The quantity the auctioneer sells to the bidders satisfy the supply constraint:
n∑
i=1
αi ≤ q = n+ c (3.10)
• Optimise the auctioneer’s total revenue:
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi) is maximal. (3.11)
This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose 〈αi〉 is the optimal allocation. Then αi > 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose there exists k such that αk = 0.
Consider the two possible cases.
• Case 1: ∑ni=1 αi = q:
As q > n, there must exist l such that αl > 1.
Now consider the following supply allocation {〈βi〉}ni=1 such that:
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

βi = αi,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, i = k, i = l
βk = 1
βl = αl − 1
With the above deﬁnition, as
∑n
i=1 βi =
∑n
i=1 αi, and βi ≤ ui, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, we can
see that {〈βi〉}ni=1 is a valid allocation.
We have:
n∑
i=1
Pi(βi)
=
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi) + Pk(1) + Pl(αl − 1)− Pl(αl)
=
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi) +K ∗ vk + K ∗ vl − Pl(αl)
≥
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi) +K ∗ vk + K ∗ vl − Pl(ul)
=
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi) +K ∗ vk + K ∗ vl − (K + 1) ∗ vl
=
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi) +K ∗ vk − vl
>
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi) (because of inequation (3.9))
This leads to contradiction, as 〈αi〉 is the optimal allocation.
• Case 2: ∑ni=1 αi < q:
Let us consider the following supply allocation {〈βi〉}ni=1 such that:


βi = αi,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, i = k
βk = 1
With the above deﬁnition, as
∑n
i=1 βi =
∑n
i=1 αi +1 ≤ q, and βi ≤ ui, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,
we can see that {〈βi〉}ni=1 is a valid allocation.
Chapter 3 Polynomial Auction Clearing Algorithms 39
We have:
n∑
i=1
Pi(βi)
=
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi) + Pk(1)
=
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi) +K ∗ vk
>
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi)
This also leads to contradiction, as 〈αi〉 is the optimal allocation.
Thus, as both cases lead to contradiction, we have αi > 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
From the above lemma, we can see that ﬁnding a supply allocation 〈αi〉 (such that 〈αi〉
satisﬁes the supply constraint and optimises the auctioneer’s revenue) is equivalent to
ﬁnding a tuple 〈α′i〉 (α′i = αi − 1) such that:
• ∑ni=1 α′i ≤ q − n = c, and
• ∑ni=1 P ′i (α′i) is maximal, where P ′i (r) = Pi(r+1)−Pi(1) (it is because, as∑ni=1 P ′i (α′i) =∑n
i=1 Pi(αi)−
∑n
i=1 Pi(1), we have
∑n
i=1 Pi(αi) is maximised if and only if
∑n
i=1 P
′
i (α
′
i)
is maximised).
Also, as P ′i (r) = Pi(r) − Pi(1), this means P ′i (r) = 0, ∀1 ≤ r ≤ si − 1 and P ′i (si) =
vi. Thus, ﬁnding the optimal allocation 〈αi〉 is equivalent to optimising the instance
{(s1, v1), (s2, v2), ..., (sn, vn), c} of the knapsack problem. As the latter is NP-complete,
so is the problem of ﬁnding the optimal allocation of our auction.
[Reverse auction case]
Again, as in [Sandholm and Suri, 2001], we reduce the knapsack problem to our reverse
auction problem.
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Let {(s1, v1), (s2, v2), ..., (sn, vn), c} be an instance of the knapsack problem. We then
create an instance of the multi-unit single-item reverse auction with free disposal and
discount bidding functions as follows.
Let the maximum quantity that bidder i is willing to trade be ui = si.
Let T be the total number of units in all the bids, that is, T =
∑n
i=1 si.
Let the demand of the auctioneer be q = T − c.
Let the price function of bidder i be Pi(r) = vi, ∀1 ≤ r ≤ si.
It is trivial that these price functions satisfy both the free disposal and the discount
property.
The goal of the clearing algorithm is then to ﬁnd a supply allocation 〈αi〉 such that:
• The quantity the auctioneer sells to the bidders satisfy the demand constraint:
n∑
i=1
αi ≥ q = T − c (3.12)
• Optimise the auctioneer’s total revenue:
n∑
i=1
Pi(αi) is minimal. (3.13)
Considering this reverse auction, we can see that ﬁnding a supply allocation 〈αi〉 (such
that 〈αi〉 satisﬁes the demand constraint and optimises the auctioneer’s revenue) is
equivalent to ﬁnding a tuple 〈α′i〉 (α′i = si − αi) such that:
• ∑ni=1 α′i ≤ T − q = c, and
• ∑ni=1 P ′i (α′i) is maximal, where P ′i (r) = Pi(si) − Pi(si − r) (it is because, as∑n
i=1 P
′
i (α
′
i) =
∑n
i=1 Pi(si) −
∑n
i=1 Pi(αi), we have
∑n
i=1 Pi(αi) is minimised if
and only if
∑n
i=1 P
′
i (α
′
i) is maximised).
Also, as P ′i (r) = Pi(si) − Pi(si − r), this means P ′i (r) = 0, ∀1 ≤ r ≤ si − 1 and
P ′i (si) = vi. Thus, ﬁnding the optimal allocation 〈αi〉 is equivalent to optimising the
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Algorithm 1. Repeat the following steps:
• For all i such that ui > q, set ui = q.
That is, we truncate the demand (supply) function to consider only quantities that
are not bigger than the supply (demand). This is because, for the forward auction
case, the auctioneer cannot sell more quantity than his supply; for the reverse
auction case, in order to minimise the total price, the auctioneer does not need to
buy more units than its demand, since the price functions satisfy the free disposal
property (inequation (3.4)).
• At each step, ﬁnd the bidder ak such that pi(uk) is maximal (minimal), then sell
(buy) uk units to (from) ak.
That is, we consider all the biggest packages oﬀered by the bidders, then choose
the package that oﬀers the biggest (smallest) unit price.
• Repeat the steps above for the set of bidders A \ ak and qnew = q − uk.
Figure 3.1: The clearing algorithm for the multi-unit single-item case.
instance {(s1, v1), (s2, v2), ..., (sn, vn), c} of the knapsack problem. As the latter is NP-
complete, so is the problem of ﬁnding the optimal allocation of our auction.
3.1.2 The Algorithm
We are now in a position to express our algorithm for solving this problem. Like [Sand-
holm et al., 2002] we adopt a greedy approach for solving this problem. Our algorithm
is presented in ﬁgure 3.1.
We can now analyse this algorithm to assess its properties.
Theorem 3.3. In the reverse auction case, if there is a solution, this algorithm will
ﬁnd it.3That is, if the total of the supplies of the bidders is larger than the auctioneer’s
demand, this algorithm will produce an allocation. Also, the total units of the solution
will be exactly equal to the auctioneer’s demand.
3In the forward case, it is trivial that there is always a solution: when the auctioneer accepts no bid,
or any single bid.
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Proof. In each step, the algorithm for the reverse case selects exactly one agent from
the set of bidders. And if its supply is less than the auctioneer’s remaining demand,
the algorithm takes all its supply. Otherwise it takes the quantity that is equal to the
remaining demand. So, if the algorithm does not terminate beforehand, it will eventually
select all the bidders and take all the supplies. Thus, if the total of the supplies of the
bidders is larger than the auctioneer’s demand, the algorithm will produce an allocation.
Moreover, in each step, the algorithm takes at most all the remaining demand, thus the
solution it produces will have the total units being equal to the auctioneer’s demand.
Theorem 3.4. The complexity of the algorithm is O(n2).
Proof. At each step, it requires O(n) to ﬁnd the biggest (smallest) element of the set
{p1(u1),
p2(u2), ..., pn(un)}. So each step has O(n) complexity. As there are at most n steps, it
is clear that the complexity of the algorithm is O(n2)
Theorem 3.5. The solution generated from the algorithm is within a bound b = n from
the optimal. That is, let Pn(O) be the optimal total price and Pn(S) be the total price
of the solution of the algorithm. Then:
Pn(O)
Pn(S)
≤ n (forward auction case) (3.14)
Pn(S)
Pn(O)
≤ n (reverse auction case) (3.15)
Proof. [Forward auction case]
Let 〈r1, r2, .., rn〉 be the solution of the algorithm; that is, the auctioneer sells ri units
to agent ai. Then the total price of the solution will be: Pn(S) =
∑n
i=1 Pi(ri). Thus,
we have to prove that:
n ·
n∑
i=1
Pi(ri) ≥ Pn(O) (3.16)
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Or, equivalently, for all other supply allocations 〈t1, t2, .., tn〉 that satisfy the supply
constraint, their total price will be no more than n times the total price of the solution
of our algorithm. That is, ∀ t1, t2, .., tn such that: 0 ≤ ti ≤ ui, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n and∑n
i=1 ti ≤ q, then:
n ·
n∑
i=1
Pi(ri) ≥
n∑
i=1
Pi(ti)
First, we can assume the maximal quantity that each bidder wants to buy is less than
the supply of the auctioneer, that is, ui ≤ q, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let s (s ≤ n) be the number of rounds of the algorithm, or the number of the agents
that were selected in the algorithm.
Without loss of generality, suppose agent ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ s is selected in round i of the
algorithm. Thus:
• In round 1, agent 1 is selected. Because the maximal quantity this agent wants to
buy is less than the supply of the auctioneer, the auctioneer will sell the agent the
maximal quantity it wants. That is, r1 = u1.
Also, the unit price of the biggest package of agent 1 will be the biggest one in all
the biggest packages oﬀered by the bidders:
p1(r1) =
n
max
i=1
pi(ui)
• In round k (2 ≤ k ≤ s), agent k is selected. Because the remaining supply of
the auctioneer is (q −∑k−1i=1 ri), the auctioneer will sell the agent the quantity
rk = min(q −
∑k−1
i=1 ri, uk).
Also, the unit price of the biggest package of agent k will be the biggest one in all
the biggest packages oﬀered by the remaining bidders:
pk(rk) =
n
max
j=k
pj(rj) (3.17)
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• The total quantity that the auctioneer sells to all the bidders will be equal to its
supply (by Theorem 3.4):
s∑
i=1
ri = q
From that we have the following lemma:
Lemma 3.6. For all 1 ≤ k ≤ n:
k∑
v=1
rvpv(rv) ≥ tkpk(tk)
Proof. Consider the three possible cases:
• For the case k = 1, we have : r1p1(r1) = u1p1(u1) ≥ t1p1(t1).
• For the case 2 ≤ k ≤ s, we have:
For all 1 ≤ v ≤ k: pv(rv) = maxnj=vpj(rj) (by (3.17))
⇒ pv(rv) ≥ pk(rk) = pk(min(q −
k−1∑
i=1
ri, uk)) (3.18)
But min(q −∑k−1i=1 ri, uk) ≤ uk and pk satisﬁes the discount property in (3.3),
thus:
pk(min(q −
k−1∑
i=1
ri, uk)) ≥ pk(uk) (3.19)
From (3.18) and (3.19) we have: pv(rv) ≥ pk(uk), ∀1 ≤ v ≤ k.
Thus:
∑k
v=1 rvpv(rv) ≥
∑k
v=1 rvpk(rk) = (
∑k
v=1 rv)pk(uk).
But rk = min(q −
∑k−1
i=1 ri, uk)
⇒∑kv=1 rv = min(q, uk +∑k−1i=1 ri) ≥ uk (as q ≥ uk).
Thus:
∑k
v=1 rvpv(rv) ≥ ukpk(uk).
But uk ≥ tk, and Pk satisﬁes the free disposal property in (3.4), so Pk(uk) ≥ Pk(tk)
or ukpk(uk) ≥ tkpk(tk).
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So we have
∑k
v=1 rvpv(rv) ≥ tkpk(tk).
• For the case k > s:
For all 1 ≤ v ≤ s: pv(rv) = maxnj=vpj(rj) (by (3.17))
⇒ pv(rv) ≥ pk(rk) = pk(min(q −
k−1∑
i=1
ri, uk)) (3.20)
But min(q −∑k−1i=1 ri, uk) ≤ uk and pk satisﬁes the discount property in (3.3),
thus:
pk(min(q −
k−1∑
i=1
ri, uk)) ≥ pk(uk) (3.21)
From (3.20) and (3.21) we have: pv(rv) ≥ pk(uk), ∀1 ≤ v ≤ s.
Thus:
∑k
v=1 rvpv(rv) ≥
∑s
v=1 rvpv(rv)
≥ (∑sv=1 rv)pk(uk) = q · pk(uk) ≥ uk · pk(uk) ≥ tk · pk(tk)
So we have:
∑k
v=1 rvpv(rv) ≥ tkpk(tk), ∀1 ≤ k ≤ n.
From lemma 3.6 we have:
n∑
k=1
k∑
v=1
rvpv(rv) ≥
n∑
k=1
tkpk(tk)
⇒
n∑
k=1
(n + 1− k)rkpk(rk) ≥
n∑
k=1
tkpk(tk)
⇒ n ·
n∑
k=1
rkpk(rk) ≥
n∑
k=1
tkpk(tk)
(As n+ 1− k ≤ n, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ n)
[Reverse auction case]
We prove by induction on the number of bidders n.
Base case (n = 1):
In the case where n = 1 the solution is optimal (because we have only one bid) so it is
clear that the proof is correct with n = 1.
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Inductive step:
Suppose that (3.15) is true for n, we will prove that (3.15) is also true for n + 1. That
is, let (r1, r2, ..., rn+1) be the supply allocation that the algorithm generates. Then we
have to prove that:
n+1∑
i=1
ri · pi(ri) ≤ (n + 1) · Pn+1(O)
Or equivalently, for all other supply allocations (t1, t2, .., tn+1) that satisfy the demand,
their total price is greater than 1n+1 times the total price of the supply allocation pro-
duced by the algorithm. That is, ∀ t1, t2, .., tn+1 such that: 0 ≤ ti ≤ ui, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1
and
∑n+1
i=1 ti ≥ q, then:
n+1∑
i=1
ri · pi(ri) ≤ (n + 1) · (
n+1∑
i=1
ti · pi(ti))
Proof of inductive step
Without loss of generality, assume that agent an+1 provides the smallest unit price.
That is, p(un+1) = minn+1i=1 p(ui). This means that agent an+1 is selected in the ﬁrst step
of the algorithm and:
rn+1 = un+1 (3.22)
Because supply allocation {ti} satisﬁes the demand (as in (3.6)), the total quantity that
the auctioneer buys from all bidders is not less than the auctioneer’s demand:
n+1∑
i=1
ti ≥ q (3.23)
But supply allocation {ri} supplies exactly the demand quantity (by Theorem 1)
⇒
n+1∑
i=1
ri = q
⇒
n+1∑
i=1
ti ≥
n+1∑
i=1
ri (by (3.23))
⇒
n∑
i=1
ti ≥
n∑
i=1
ri (as tn+1 ≤ un+1 = rn+1, from (3.22))
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Moreover, by inductive hypothesis, (3.15) is true for n agents.
⇒
n∑
i=1
ri · pi(ri) ≤ n ·
n∑
i=1
ti · pi(ti)
⇒
n∑
i=1
ri · pi(ri) ≤ n ·
n+1∑
i=1
ti · pi(ti) (3.24)
(as tn+1 · pn+1(tn+1) ≥ 0)
Also:
un+1 · pn+1(un+1) ≤
n+1∑
i=1
ti · pn+1(un+1)
(as un+1 ≤ q ≤
∑n+1
i=1 ti, from (3.23))
But because pn+1(un+1) is the smallest unit price.
⇒ un+1 · pn+1(un+1) ≤
n+1∑
i=1
ti · pi(ti)
or
rn+1 · pn+1(rn+1) ≤
n+1∑
i=1
ti · pi(ti) (3.25)
From (3.24) and (3.25), we have:
n+1∑
i=1
ri · pi(ri) ≤ (n + 1) · (
n+1∑
i=1
ti · pi(ti))
The completion of the inductive step completes our proof.
Although multi-unit single-item auctions are not our main target case, this algorithm still
represents a contribution in its own right. While Sandholm and Suri’s algorithms target
the same environment as this, they are only applicable in the speciﬁc case where the
supply curves are linear [Sandholm and Suri, 2001]. In contrast, our result is applicable
to the more general case; that is, sub-additive, free disposal supply curves.
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Having dealt with the multi-unit single-item case, the next section generalises the algo-
rithm to the multi-unit combinatorial case.
3.2 Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
To deal with the multi-unit combinatorial case, we need to add one more assumption
about the price functions of the items. This is that there exists a number K > 1 such
that for any price function from any bidder, K units of any item will be more expensive
than 1 unit of any other item:
∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, i = j, d ∈ N:
Pi(r1, .., ri + d, .., rj , .., rm) ≤ Pi(r1, .., ri, .., rj + Kd, .., rm) (3.26)
That is, for any package, if we substitute d units of any item in this package by K ·d units
of any other item, then the price of the new package will be more expensive or equal to
the price of the old package. For example, in the case K = 3,m = 2, r1 = 2, r2 = 4, d = 1,
we have: for any price function, the price of 3 units of item 1 and 4 units of item 2 will
be less than or equal to the price of 2 units of item 1 and 7 (i.e. 4 + 3) units of items 2.
We believe this is a realistic assumption because in a competitive market the unit price
of any item is always likely to be within a ﬁnite range; that is, it cannot be arbitrarily
high or low.4 This is especially true in the VO creation context, as the VO’s potential
partners compete against each other to join the VO and so they would not bid with a too
high price (otherwise they would fail in the reverse auction). On the other hand, they
cannot bid with a too low price, because of the manufacturing cost of a product/service.
From this, a number of lemmas follow:
Lemma 3.7. For any package of items, if we replace d units of any item with d units
of any other item, then the total price of the new package of items is not bigger than K
times the total price of the old package:
4There are however domains where this assumption does not hold, for example, when the price equals
or is less than zero. This can occur when, for example, a ﬁrm gives free promotion to advertise a new
product or to expand its market.
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∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, i = j, d ∈ N:
Pi(r1, .., ri + d, .., rj , .., rm) ≤ K · Pi(r1, .., ri, .., rj + d, .., rm) (3.27)
Proof. We have:
Pi(r1, .., ri + d, .., rj , .., rm)
≤ Pi(r1, .., ri, .., rj + Kd, .., rm) (by (3.26))
But K > 1 ⇒ Kr ≥ r for all r. Also Pi satisﬁes the free disposal property (in (3.2)).
⇒ Pi(r1, .., ri + d, .., rj , .., rm)
≤ Pi(Kr1, ..,Kri, ..,Krj + Kd, ..,Krm)
≤ Pi(r1, .., ri, .., rj + d, .., rm) + Pi((K − 1)r1,
.., (K − 1)ri, .., (K − 1)(rj + d), .., (K − 1)rm)
≤ ...
≤ K · Pi(r1, .., ri, .., rj + d, .., rm)
(by the discount property in (3.1))
Lemma 3.8. For any two packages, if the total number of units of the ﬁrst package is
not bigger than the total number of units of the second package, then the total price of
the ﬁrst package is not bigger than Km−1 times the total price of the second package:
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, ∀r1, r2, ..., rm, s1, s2, ..., sm such that
m∑
j=1
rj ≤
m∑
j=1
sj
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Then:
Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm) ≤ Km−1Pi(s1, s2, ..., sm) (3.28)
Proof. Let dj = (sj − rj)
⇒
m∑
j=1
dj =
m∑
j=1
sj −
m∑
j=1
rj ≥ 0 (3.29)
Now there are 2 cases:
• Case 1: di ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m. Then we have:
Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm) ≤ Pi(s1, s2, ..., sm)
(because Pi satisﬁes the free disposal property in (3.2))
⇒ Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm) ≤ Km−1Pi(s1, s2, ..., sm)
• Case 2: There exists a dk < 0.
Without loss of generality, suppose that dm < 0. Then we have:
Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm−1, rm) ≤ K · Pi(r1 − dm, r2, ..., rm−1, sm)
(by lemma 3.7)
Let r(2)1 = r1 − dm, r(2)i = ri, ∀ 2 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
⇒ Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm−1, rm) ≤ K · Pi(r(2)1 , r(2)2 , ..., r(2)m−1, sm)
Also:
m−1∑
j=1
r
(2)
j =
m−1∑
j=1
rj − dm
⇒
m−1∑
j=1
r
(2)
j ≤
m−1∑
j=1
sj (by (3.29))
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Repeating the whole step above, it will take at most m − 1 steps to terminate. Thus,
after at most m− 1 steps, we will have:
Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm) ≤ Km−1Pi(s1, s2, ..., sm)
Lemma 3.9. For any two packages, if the total number of units of the ﬁrst package is
not bigger than the total number of units of the second package, then the average unit
price of the ﬁrst package is not smaller than 12Km−1 times the average unit price of the
second package:
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, r1, r2, ..., rm, s1, s2, ..., sm such that
∑m
j=1 rj ≤
∑m
j=1 sj, then:
2Km−1 · Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm)
r1 + r2 + ... + rm
≥ Pi(s1, s2, ..., sm)
s1 + s2 + ... + sm
(3.30)
Proof. Let k = [
∑m
j=1 sj∑m
j=1 rj
], that is, k is the integral part of
∑m
j=1 sj∑m
j=1 rj
.
⇒ k ≤
∑m
j=1 sj∑m
j=1 rj
< k + 1 (3.31)
⇒ (k + 1)
m∑
j=1
rj >
m∑
j=1
sj
⇒ Km−1Pi((k + 1)r1, (k + 1)r2, ..., (k + 1)rm) ≥ Pi(s1, s2, ..., sm)
(by lemma 3.8)
⇒ Km−1(k + 1)Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm) ≥ Pi(s1, s2, ..., sm) (3.32)
(by the discount property in (3.1))
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Also:
m∑
j=1
rj ≤
m∑
j=1
sj ⇒
∑m
j=1 sj∑m
j=1 rj
≥ 1 ⇒ k ≥ 1
⇒ k + 1 ≤ 2k ≤ 2 ·
∑m
j=1 sj∑m
j=1 rj
(from (3.31))
⇒ 2Km−1 ·
∑m
j=1 sj∑m
j=1 rj
Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm) ≥ Pi(s1, s2, ..., sm)
(by inequation (3.33))
⇒ 2Km−1 · Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm)
r1 + r2 + ... + rm
≥ Pi(s1, s2, ..., sm)
s1 + s2 + ... + sm
With these lemmas in place, we can now proceed with the presentation of the generali-
sation of the single-item algorithm in section 3.1. The algorithm for the general case is
presented in ﬁgure 3.2.
We can now analyse this algorithm to assess its properties.
Theorem 3.10. If there is a solution, then this algorithm will ﬁnd it. That is, if the
total of the demands (supplies) of the bidders is larger than the auctioneer’s supply
(demand), this algorithm will produce an allocation. Also, the total units of the solution
will be exactly equal to the auctioneer’s supply (demand).
Proof. In each step, the algorithm for the forward (reverse) case selects exactly one
agent from the set of bidders. And if its demand (supply) is less than the auctioneer’s
remaining supply (demand), the algorithm takes all its demand (supply). Otherwise it
takes the quantity that is equal to the remaining supply (demand). So, if the algorithm
does not terminate beforehand, it will eventually select all the bidders and take all the
demands (supplies). Thus, if the total of the demands (supplies) of the bidders is larger
than the auctioneer’s supply (demand), the algorithm will produce an allocation.
Moreover, in each step, the algorithm takes at most all the remaining supply (demand).
Thus the solution it produces will have the total units being equal to the auctioneer’s
supply (demand).
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Algorithm 2. At each round k ≥ 1 repeat the following steps:
• For all i, j, set uji (k) = min(uji , qj(k − 1)).
(qj(0) = qj)
That is, we truncate the demand (supply) function to consider only quantities that
are not bigger than the supply (demand). This is because, for the forward auction
case, the auctioneer cannot sell more quantity than his supply; for the reverse
auction case, in order to minimise the total price, the auctioneer does not need to
buy more units than its demand, since the price functions satisfy the free disposal
property (inequation (3.2)).
• Find the bidder ahk such that:
Phk(u
1
hk
(k), u2hk(k), ..., u
m
hk
(k))
u1hk(k) + u
2
hk
(k) + ... + umhk(k)
is maximal (minimal),
then select ahk to provide all its units (u
1
hk
(k), u2hk(k), ..., u
m
hk
(k)).
That is, we consider all the biggest packages oﬀered by the bidders, then choose
the package that oﬀers the biggest (smallest) average unit price.
Note that this is not necessarily the package that oﬀers the biggest (smallest)
average in all packages, because a smaller package may have a bigger (smaller)
average unit price.
• Repeat the steps with the new set of bidders A \ ahk and new supply (demand)
qj(k) = qj(k − 1)− ujhk(k).
Figure 3.2: The clearing algorithm for the multi-unit combinatorial case.
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Theorem 3.11. The complexity of the algorithm is O(n2)
Proof. At each step, it requires O(n) to ﬁnd the biggest (smallest) element of the set
{Pk(u1k ,u2k,...,umk )
u1k+u
2
k+...+u
m
k
}ni=1. So each step has O(n) complexity. As there are at most n steps,
the complexity of the algorithm is O(n2).
Theorem 3.12. The solution generated from the algorithm is within a bound b = 2n ·
Km−1 from the optimal. That is, let Pn(O) be the optimal total price and Pn(S) be the
total price of the solution of the algorithm. Then:
Pn(O)
Pn(S)
≤ 2n ·Km−1 (forward auction case) (3.33)
Pn(S)
Pn(O)
≤ 2n ·Km−1 (reverse auction case) (3.34)
Proof. [Forward auction case]
Let {rji }, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m be the solution of the algorithm; that is, the auctioneer
sells rji units of item j to agent ai. We have to prove that:
2nKm−1 ·
n∑
i=1
Pi(r1i , .., r
m
i ) ≥ Pn(O) (3.35)
Or, equivalently, for all other supply allocations {tji} that satisfy the supply constraint,
their total price will be no more than 2nKm−1 the total price of the solution of the
algorithm. That is, ∀ tji such that: 0 ≤ tji ≤ uji , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m and
∑n
i=1 t
j
i ≤ qj,
then:
2nKm−1 ·
n∑
i=1
Pi(r1i , .., r
m
i ) ≥
n∑
i=1
Pi(t1i , .., t
m
i )
First, we can assume the maximal quantity of each item that each bidder wants to buy is
less than the auctioneer’s supply for that item, that is, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m: uji ≤ qj.
So uji (1) = u
j
i .
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Let s (s ≤ n) be the number of rounds of the algorithm, or the number of agents that
were selected in the algorithm.
Without loss of generality, suppose agent ak, 1 ≤ k ≤ s is selected in round k of the
algorithm. Thus we have:
hk = k, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ s (3.36)
rjk = u
j
k(k) ,∀1 ≤ k ≤ s (3.37)
Pk(r1k, .., r
m
k )∑m
j=1 r
j
k
=
n
max
i=k
Pi(u1i (k), .., u
m
i (k))∑m
j=1 u
j
i (k)
,∀1 ≤ k ≤ s (3.38)
Also, the total quantity of each item that the auctioneer sells to all the bidders will be
equal to its supply for that item (by Theorem 3.10). That is:
s∑
i=1
rji = qj (3.39)
From the algorithm, we can see that : uji (k) = min(u
j
i , qj −
∑k−1
v=1 u
j
hv
(v)). Thus, by
equation (3.36):
uji (k) = min(u
j
i , qj −
k−1∑
v=1
ujv(v)) (3.40)
From that we have the following lemma:
Lemma 3.13. For all 1 ≤ k ≤ n:
2Km−1 ·
k∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ Pk(t1k, .., tmk )
Proof. There are two cases:
• Case 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ s:
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For all 1 ≤ v ≤ k we have:
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ (
m∑
j=1
rjv)
Pk(u1k(k), .., u
m
k (k))∑m
j=1 u
j
k(k)
(from (3.38))
But
∑m
j=1 u
j
k(k) ≤
∑m
j=1 u
j
k
⇒ 2Km−1 · Pk(u
1
k(k), .., u
m
k (k))∑m
j=1 u
j
k(k)
≥ Pk(u
1
k, .., u
m
k )∑m
j=1 u
j
k
Thus:
2Km−1 · Pv(r1v , .., rmv ) ≥ (
m∑
j=1
rjv)
Pk(u1k, .., u
m
k )∑m
j=1 u
j
k
⇒ 2Km−1 ·
k∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ (
k∑
v=1
m∑
j=1
rjv)
Pk(u1k, .., u
m
k )∑m
j=1 u
j
k
⇒ 2Km−1 ·
k∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ (
m∑
j=1
k∑
v=1
rjv)
Pk(u1k, .., u
m
k )∑m
j=1 u
j
k
⇒ 2Km−1 ·
k∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ (
m∑
j=1
k∑
v=1
ujv(v))
Pk(u1k, .., u
m
k )∑m
j=1 u
j
k
ujk(k) = min(u
j
k, qj −
k−1∑
v=1
ujv(v)) (from (3.40))
⇒
k∑
v=1
ujv(v) = min(u
j
k +
k−1∑
v=1
ujv(v), qj)
But ujk +
∑k−1
v=1 u
j
v(v) ≥ ujk and qj ≥ ujk thus:
k∑
v=1
ujv(v) ≥ ujk
⇒ 2Km−1 ·
k∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ (
m∑
j=1
ujk)
Pk(u1k, .., u
m
k )∑m
j=1 u
j
k
⇒ 2Km−1 ·
k∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ Pk(u1k, .., umk )
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• Case 2, k ≥ s: By proving similarly to case 1, we have:
2Km−1 ·
s∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ (
m∑
j=1
s∑
v=1
rjv)
Pk(u1k, .., u
m
k )∑m
j=1 u
j
k
But
∑s
v=1 r
j
v = uj
⇒ 2Km−1 ·
s∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ (
m∑
j=1
ujk)
Pk(u1k, .., u
m
k )∑m
j=1 u
j
k
⇒ 2Km−1 ·
s∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ Pk(u1k, .., umk )
⇒ 2Km−1 ·
s∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ Pk(t1k, .., tmk )
(by the free disposal property in (3.2))
⇒ 2Km−1 ·
k∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥ Pk(t1k, .., tmk )
So we have: 2Km−1 ·∑kv=1 Pv(r1v , .., rmv ) ≥ Pk(t1k, .., tmk ), ∀1 ≤ k ≤ n.
From lemma 3.13 we have:
2Km−1 ·
n∑
k=1
k∑
v=1
Pv(r1v , .., r
m
v ) ≥
n∑
k=1
Pk(t1k, .., t
m
k )
⇒ 2Km−1 ·
n∑
k=1
(n + 1− k)Pk(r1k, .., rmk ) ≥
n∑
k=1
Pk(t1k, .., t
m
k )
⇒ 2nKm−1 ·
n∑
k=1
Pk(r1k, .., r
m
k ) ≥
n∑
k=1
Pk(t1k, .., t
m
k )
(as n + 1− k ≤ n, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ n)
[Reverse auction case]
We prove by induction of the number of bidders n.
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Base case (n = 1):
In the case where n = 1 the solution is optimal (because there is only one bid to choose
from), so it is clear that the proof is correct with n = 1.
Inductive step:
Suppose that (3.34) is true for n, we will prove that (3.34) is also true for n+1. That is,
let {rji }, 1 ≤ i ≤ n+1, 1 ≤ j ≤ m be the supply allocation that the algorithm generates.
Then we have to prove that:
n+1∑
i=1
Pi(r1i , r
2
i , ..., r
m
i ) ≤ 2n ·Km−1Pn+1(O)
Or equivalently, for every other supply allocation {tji} that satisﬁes the auctioneer’s
demand, the total price of {rji } is not bigger than 2n · Km−1 times the total price of
{tji}:
n+1∑
i=1
Pi(r1i , r
2
i , ..., r
m
i ) ≤ 2(n + 1) ·Km−1
n+1∑
i=1
Pi(t1i , t
2
i , ..., t
m
i )
Proof of inductive step
Without loss of generality, assume that agent an+1 provides the lowest average price in
all the biggest packages:
Pn+1(u1n+1, u
2
n+1, ..., u
m
n+1)
u1n+1 + u
2
n+1 + ... + u
m
n+1
=
n+1
min
i=1
Pi(u1i , u
2
i , ..., u
m
i )
u1i + u
2
i + ... + u
m
i
(3.41)
This means an+1 is selected in the ﬁrst step of the algorithm and:
rjn+1 = u
j
n+1, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m (3.42)
For all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, because supply allocation {tji} satisﬁes the auctioneer’s demand:
⇒
n+1∑
i=1
tji ≥ qj (3.43)
(by inequation (2.2))
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But supply allocation {rji } supplies exactly the demand quantity (by Theorem 3.10).
⇒
n+1∑
i=1
rji = qj
⇒
n+1∑
i=1
tji ≥
n+1∑
i=1
rji
⇒
n∑
i=1
tji ≥
n∑
i=1
rji
(as tjn+1 ≤ ujn+1 = rjn+1 by (3.42))
Moreover, by inductive hypothesis, (3.34) is true for n agents.
⇒
n∑
i=1
Pi(r1i , r
2
i , ..., r
m
i ) ≤ 2nKm−1 ·
n∑
i=1
Pi(t1i , t
2
i , ..., t
m
i )
⇒
n∑
i=1
Pi(r1i , r
2
i , ..., r
m
i ) ≤ 2nKm−1 ·
n+1∑
i=1
Pi(t1i , t
2
i , ..., t
m
i ) (3.44)
(because Pn+1(t1n+1, t
2
n+1, ..., t
m
n+1) ≥ 0)
Also:
Pn+1(r1n+1, r
2
n+1, ..., r
m
n+1)
= Pn+1(u1n+1, u
2
n+1, ..., u
m
n+1) (by (3.42))
= (
m∑
j=1
ujn+1) ·
Pn+1(u1n+1, u
2
n+1, ..., u
m
n+1)∑m
j=1 u
j
n+1
But ujn+1 ≤ qj, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
⇒ Pn+1(r1n+1, r2n+1, ..., rmn+1)
≤ (
m∑
j=1
qj)
Pn+1(u1n+1, u
2
n+1, ..., u
m
n+1)∑m
j=1 u
j
n+1
≤ (
m∑
j=1
n+1∑
i=1
tji )
Pn+1(u1n+1, u
2
n+1, ..., u
m
n+1)∑m
j=1 u
j
n+1
(by (3.43))
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≤
n+1∑
i=1
(
m∑
j=1
tji
Pi(u1i , u
2
i , ..., u
m
i )∑m
j=1 u
j
i
) (because of (3.41))
≤
n+1∑
i=1
(
m∑
j=1
tji2K
m−1Pi(t1i , t
2
i , ..., t
m
i )∑m
j=1 t
j
i
) (by lemma 3.9)
⇒ Pn+1(r1n+1, r2n+1, ..., rmn+1) ≤ 2Km−1 · (
n+1∑
i=1
Pi(t1i , t
2
i , ..., t
m
i )) (3.45)
From (3.44) and (3.45) we have:
n+1∑
i=1
Pi(r1i , r
2
i , ..., r
m
i ) ≤ 2(n + 1) ·Km−1
n+1∑
i=1
Pi(t1i , t
2
i , ..., t
m
i )
The completion of the inductive step completes our proof.
3.3 Experimental Evaluation
To accompany the theoretical analysis that we have done so far, this section outlines the
experimental evaluation of our clearing algorithms to see how they perform in reality.
This is because the theoretical analysis is in terms of worst-case, however by doing an
experimental analysis we can have a clearer idea of average case and how the algorithms
perform in practical scenarios. Speciﬁcally, we want to assess how much closer to the
optimal are the solutions generated by the algorithms compared to the worst-case bound.
We will do the evaluation for both the single-item (subsection 3.3.1) and combinatorial
cases (subsection 3.3.2).
3.3.1 Multi-Unit Single-Item Auctions
We implement a problem generator that enables us to evaluate the performance of our
algorithms for a range of values that are typical for the types of VO problems in which
we are interested (see chapter 6 for relevant examples). However, as there is no standard
benchmark in this area, we make our problem generator similar to [Eso et al., 2001],
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which is the only previous attempt to generate realistic problems for auctions with
bidding functions. Below are the parameters used in our problem generator:
• NumBids - number of bidders: varied from 10 to 16.
• MaxNumSegments - Maximum number of segments of a curve bid: from 2 to
4.
Given the two parameters above, our problem generator consists of the following steps:
• Generating the call for bids: the requested quantity is randomly selected in the
interval [101, 50 ∗NumBids]. This range is chosen because:
– It makes sure the generated problem has solutions: The auctioneer’s requested
quantity is less than or equal to 50 ∗ NumBids, and also the maximum
quantity that each bidder is willing to trade is at least 50 (see below) so there
is always enough demand (supply) from the bidders.
– It ensures there are at least 2 winners: The auctioneer’s requested quantity
is at least 101, and the maximum quantity that each bidder is willing to
trade is not bigger than 100, so the number of winners will be at least 2.
This is preferable because if the auctioneer’s requested quantity is small (for
example, less than 50) there will be only one winner and the algorithm will be
very straightforward — just choosing the bidder who bid the highest (lowest)
price for that quantity of items.
• For bidders i = 1, ..., NumBids, construct the bid curve for bidder i by doing the
following:
– The maximum quantity that it is willing to trade (MaxQuantity) is randomly
selected in the interval [50, 100]. This range is chosen for the above reasons.
– The number of segments of its curve bid (NumSegs) is randomly selected in
the interval [1,MaxNumSegments]. This range is chosen so that it adds
more variety into the experiment.
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– For the ﬁrst segment: start quantity is: Start1 = 1, end quantity (End1) is
randomly selected in the interval [1,MaxQuantity−NumSegs+1] and unit
price UP1 is randomly selected in the interval [100, 102].
– For segments j > 1: start quantity is segment j − 1’s end quantity +1:
Startj = Endj−1+1, end quantity (Endj) is randomly selected in the interval
[Startj,MaxQuantity −NumSegs + j] (except that Endj = MaxQuantity
when j = NumSegs) and unit price UPj = UPj−1 ∗ (1 − DiscountRate)
where DiscountRate is randomly selected in the interval [0.01, 0.05].
The last two steps are carried out in these ways to ensure that the generated
bidding functions satisfy the free disposal and discount properties, while still
adding a degree of variety into the experiment.
We now turn to the results. We ran the algorithm for 40 generated problems and record
the bounds from the optimal of the generated solutions. The results are presented in
ﬁgures 3.3, 3.4 (forward auction case) and ﬁgures 3.5, 3.6 (reverse auction case) as box
plots5. The number of runs (40) guarantees us a 95% conﬁdence interval, if we accept
the bound to have a precision of:
• Plus or minus 0.001 for the box plots in ﬁgure 3.3 and the ﬁrst box plot in ﬁgure
1.2
• Plus or minus 0.002 for the second and third box plots in ﬁgure 3.4
• Plus or minus 0.0001 for the ﬁrst box plot in ﬁgure 3.5
• Plus or minus 0.00002 for the second and third box plots in ﬁgure 3.5
• Plus or minus 0.0005 for the fourth box plot in ﬁgure 3.5 and the box plots in
ﬁgure 3.6.
As can be seen, all of the bounds are very close to 1, speciﬁcally, they are in the
interval [1, 1.02]. This is signiﬁcantly lower than the theoretically proved bound which
5A box plot is a graphical representation of a set of one-dimensional data and comprises of a central
box (bounded below by the lower hinge, bounded above by the upper hinge, and with a central line
showing the median), two protruding lines (whiskers) extending from the central box with lengths no
larger than 1.5 times the length of the box, and outliers marked individually data points that lie beyond
the whiskers.
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Figure 3.3: The experimental result of our algorithm for multi-unit single-item for-
ward auctions (varying the number of bidders).
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Figure 3.4: The experimental result of our algorithm for multi-unit single-item for-
ward auctions (varying the maximum number of segments).
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Figure 3.5: The experimental result of our algorithm for multi-unit single-item reverse
auctions (varying the number of bidders).
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Figure 3.6: The experimental result of our algorithm for multi-unit single-item reverse
auctions (varying the maximum number of segments).
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is NumBids (i.e., 10, 12, 14 or 16 in this experiment). This suggests that in many
practical cases, our algorithm performs signiﬁcantly better than the theoretical proved
worst-case analysis.
Moreover, by performing ANOVA tests, we can make a number of additional observa-
tions. Speciﬁcally, in the forward case we can determine that there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the diﬀerent numbers of bidders. However, there is a signiﬁcant dif-
ference between the diﬀerent maximum numbers of segments. This suggests that the
maximum number of segments has a bigger inﬂuence on the bound from the optimal
of the solutions generated by our algorithms. Turning now to the reverse case, we can
determine there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the diﬀerent numbers of bidders nor
between the diﬀerent maximum numbers of segments. Thus no hypotheses can be made
about the eﬀect of these parameters on the values of the bound.
3.3.2 Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
As in the multi-unit single-item case, we implement a problem generator that enables
the performance of our algorithms to be evaluated in a range of environments. Below
are the parameters used in this problem generator:
• NumBids — number of bidders: varied from 5 to 8.
• NumItems — number of items: from 2 to 4.
• MaxNumSegments — maximum number of segments of a curve bid: from 2 to
4.
Given the above parameters, our problem generator consists of the following steps:
• Generating the call for bids: the requested quantity is randomly selected in the
interval [101, 50 ∗ NumBids]. Again, this range is chosen for the same reasons
given above in the single-item case (except that in this case, we cannot guarantee
that the generated problem has solutions, because a bidder may want to trade
only one or few items, not all of them).
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• For bidders i = 1, ..., NumBids: The actual number of items that bidder i wants
to trade is chosen randomly from the range [1, NumItems]. Now for any item k
that bidder i is willing to trade, construct the bid curve for bidder i by doing the
following:
– The maximum quantity that it is willing to trade (MaxQuantity) is randomly
selected in the interval [50, 100].
– The number of segments of its curve bid (NumSegs) is randomly selected in
the interval [1,MaxNumSegments].
– For the ﬁrst segment: start quantity is: Startk1 = 1, end quantity (End
k
1) is
randomly selected in the interval [1,MaxQuantity−NumSegs+1] and unit
price UP k1 is randomly selected in the interval [100, 102].
– For segments j > 1: start quantity is segment j − 1’s end quantity +1:
Startkj = End
k
j−1+1, end quantity (End
k
j ) is randomly selected in the interval
[Startkj ,MaxQuantity −NumSegs+ j] (except that Endkj = MaxQuantity
when j = NumSegs) and unit price UP kj = UP
k
j−1 ∗ (1 − DiscountRate)
where DiscountRate is randomly selected in the interval [0.01, 0.05].
– For all bidders, set the correlation values wi(NumSegs1i , NumSegs
2
i , ...,
NumSegsNumItemsi ) to be a random value in the interval [MinV al, 1] where
MinV al is the smallest possible value to satisfy the free disposal assumption.
Again, the last three steps are carried out in these ways to ensure that the
generated bidding functions satisfy the free disposal and discount properties,
while still adding a degree of variety into the experiment.
• Check if the generated problem has solutions, if it does not, re-generate it6.
We now turn to the results. As before, we ran the algorithm for 40 generated problems
and record the bounds from the optimal of the generated solutions. The results are
presented in ﬁgures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 (forward auction case) and ﬁgures 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12
(reverse auction case). Again, the number of runs (40) guarantees us a 95% conﬁdence
6In some reverse auction cases the generated problem does not have any solutions because the total
supply from the bidders does not meet the auctioneer’s demand
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Figure 3.7: The experimental result of our algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial
forward auctions (varying the number of bidders).
interval, if we accept the bound to have some speciﬁc precisions (these are broadly as
per subsection 3.3.1).
As can be seen, all of the bounds are very close to 1, speciﬁcally, in the interval
[1, 1.025]. Again this is signiﬁcantly lower than the theoretically proved bound which is
2 ∗NumBids ∗KNumItems−1 (K is a constant). This suggests that in many cases, our
algorithm is likely to perform signiﬁcantly better than the theoretical proved worst-case
analysis.
On the other hand, the ANOVA tests performed on this data show no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence between the diﬀerent tested values of the number of bidders, the maximum number
of segments or the number of items, so no hypotheses can be made about the eﬀect of
these parameters on the values of the bound.
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Figure 3.8: The experimental result of our algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial
forward auctions (varying the maximum number of segments).
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Figure 3.9: The experimental result of our algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial
forward auctions (varying the number of items).
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Figure 3.10: The experimental result of our algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial
reverse auctions (varying the number of bidders).
2 3 4
1
1.002
1.004
1.006
1.008
1.01
1.012
1.014
1.016
1.018
Bo
un
d 
fro
m
 th
e 
op
tim
al
Maximum number of segments
Figure 3.11: The experimental result of our algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial
reverse auctions (varying the maximum number of segments).
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Figure 3.12: The experimental result of our algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial
reverse auctions (varying the number of items).
3.4 Summary
In this chapter we developed, for the ﬁrst time, polynomial algorithms for clearing multi-
unit combinatorial auctions with demand/supply functions. While previous work has
concentrated on single-item auctions with demand/supply curves or combinatorial auc-
tions with atomic propositions, we generalised the problem to multi-unit single-item and
multi-unit combinatorial auctions with demand/supply functions. For this very general
case, we showed that our algorithms are of polynomial complexity and can generate
solutions that are within a bound of the optimal. We then showed our experimental
results for both the multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial cases. For the
problems we considered, our algorithms produce solutions that are within a bound from
the optimal that is much smaller than the theoretically proved bound. Speciﬁcally, all
of the bounds are within the range [1, 1.025], while the theoretical bound is n in the
multi-unit single-item case, and is 2nKm−1 in the multi-unit combinatorial case (n is
the number of bidders, m is the number of items, and K is a constant). Moreover, we be-
lieve the generalisation to multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions
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with demand/supply functions is an important step toward realising the full application
potential of combinatorial auctions since it enables us to deal with a maximally ﬂexible
and eﬃcient scheme in a computationally tractable manner.
Chapter 4
Optimal Auction Clearing
Algorithms
In contrast to chapter 3, this chapter presents optimal clearing algorithms for multi-unit
single-item and multi-unit combinatorial forward and reverse auctions with demand/sup-
ply functions. Speciﬁcally, we consider two classes of demand/supply function. Firstly,
those in which the demand/supply curves for each individual commodity are composed
of many linear segments (i.e. piece-wise linear functions) (section 4.1). Price functions
that are composed of linear segments are common in business, thus this is a very appro-
priate auction settings for the VO context and for e-business in general. Secondly, those
in which the function indicating the price for adding one more single unit into a package
is monotonic (called monotonic one-unit-diﬀerence functions) (section 4.2). This sec-
ond class is not particularly common, however, it is considered because it is amenable
to the same solution as piece-wise linear and it covers another portion of the general
auction clearing problem space. For each of these cases, we analyse the complexity of
our algorithms and prove that they are guaranteed to ﬁnd the optimal allocation.
As mentioned in section 2.2, it is impossible to ﬁnd a polynomial algorithm that is
guaranteed to ﬁnd the optimal allocation, unless P = NP. In this section, we concentrate
on optimality and so, necessarily, our algorithms are not polynomial.
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4.1 Piece-wise Linear Supply/Demand Curve Bids
In this section, we consider the case where:
Pi(r1, r2, ..., rm) = ωi(t1, t2, ..., tm) · (
m∑
j=1
P ji (rj))
where P ji is the price function of agent i for item j, in the form of a piecewise linear
curve (i.e. the function’s graph is composed of many segments, each of which is linear),
tj is the segment number of P
j
i that rj belongs to and
ωi : {(t1, t2, ..., tm)|tj is a segment number of P ji } → Q∗
is the function that expresses correlations between items in the set S.
More precisely, each piece-wise linear function P ji is composed of N
j
i linear segments,
numbered from 1 to N ji . Each individual segment with segment number l, 1 ≤ l ≤ N ji ,
is described by a starting quantity sji,l and an ending quantity e
j
i,l, a unit price π
j
i,l and
a ﬁxed price cji,l, with the meaning that: bidder i wants to trade any r units of item j,
sji,l ≤ r ≤ eji,l with the price:
P = πji,l · r + cji,l
Note that the segments are not required to be continuous; that is, (sji,l+1 − eji,l) may
not equal 1. Also, for convenience, we call segment number 0 the segment in which the
starting quantity, the ending quantity, the unit price and the ﬁxed price are all equal
to 0. Thus, the number of segments of P ji , including this special segment, will equal
N ji + 1.
The correlation function ωi has many potential uses in real-life scenarios. For example,
suppose bidder i, selling 3 items (1, 2 and 3), wants to express things like “I am willing to
sell r1 units of item 1 and r2 units of item 2 together with a price p, but not separately”.
Using our correlation function, this can be expressed by adding segments t1 and t2, which
contain only r1 and r2, to the functions P 1i and P
2
i , respectively, then giving ωi(t1, t2, t3)
a very small value, for every t3, and giving P 1i (r1) and P
2
i (r2) very big values. This way,
the auctioneer will never choose to buy r1 or r2 separately.
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For convenience in presentation, from this section on, we will use the following terms.
Definition 4.1. A valid allocation is a supply allocation that completely satisﬁes the
demand constraint.
Definition 4.2. A supply allocation 〈tji 〉 is not less proﬁtable than a supply allocation
〈rji 〉 if the former brings the auctioneer an equal or bigger revenue than the latter. That
is:
P (〈tji 〉) ≥ P (〈rji 〉) (forward case)
P (〈tji 〉) ≤ P (〈rji 〉) (reverse case) (4.1)
According to this deﬁnition of proﬁtability, the most proﬁtable valid allocation optimises
the auctioneer’s total revenue. Thus, this is what our algorithms aim to ﬁnd. We
ﬁrst consider the multi-unit single-item case (subsection 4.1.1), before moving onto the
combinatorial case (subsection 4.1.2).
4.1.1 Multi-Unit Single-Items
Using the notation from the previous section, the single-item case can be re-formulated
as follows. Let n be the number of bidders. The auctioneer has a supply (demand) q.
Each bidder i submits bids in the form of a piece-wise linear demand (supply) curve:
Pi : N → R, which is composed of Ni linear segments. Each segment l, 0 ≤ l ≤ Ni is
described by a starting quantity si,l and an ending quantity ei,l, a unit price πi,l and a
ﬁxed price ci,l.
Definition 4.3. The dominant set D is the set of all allocations (r1, r2, .., rn) such that
there exists a k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, such that all rλ1 , ..., rλk−1 equal the ending quantity of the
segments that they belong to, and all rλk+1, ..., rλn equal the starting quantity of the
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segments that they belong to:1


rλi = eλi,tλi ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
rλi = sλi,tλi ,∀k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
rλk = q −
∑n
i=1,i=k rλi
where:
• ti is the segment on Pi that ri belongs to. That is, si,ti ≤ ri ≤ ei,ti .
• (λi)ni=1 is any permutation of (1, 2, ..., n) such that {πλ1,tλ1}ni=1 is sorted decreas-
ingly (increasingly):2
πλ1,tλ1 ≥ πλ2,tλ2 ≥ ... ≥ πλn,tλn (forward case)
πλ1,tλ1 ≤ πλ2,tλ2 ≤ ... ≤ πλn,tλn (reverse case)
From this, a number of lemmas follow:
Lemma 4.4. For every allocation (r1, r2, ..., rn) there exists an allocation in the domi-
nant set D that is not less proﬁtable than it.
Proof. Let (r1, r2, ..., rn) be an allocation. Let ti be the segment that ri belongs to.
Suppose (λi)ni=1 is a permutation of (1, 2, ..., n) such that:
πλ1,tλ1 ≥ πλ2,tλ2 ≥ ... ≥ πλn,tλn (forward case)
πλ1,tλ1 ≤ πλ2,tλ2 ≤ ... ≤ πλn,tλn (reverse case) (4.2)
Step 1: we prove that there exists an allocation 〈r(1)i 〉, that is not less proﬁtable than
〈ri〉, where r(1)i belongs to segment ti of Pi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n and, either r(1)λ1 = eλ1,tλ1 or:


r
(1)
λi
= sλi,tλi ,∀2 ≤ i ≤ n
r
(1)
λ1
= q −∑ni=2 r(1)λi
1There may be many dominant sets D, as there may exist many permutations (λi)
n
i=1.
2There may exist many such permutations (λi)
n
i=1, as there may be many ways to sort the set
{πi,ti}ni=1.
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Let us consider the case where rλ1 < eλ1,tλ1 and there exists a k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n, such that
rλk > sλk,tλk .
Consider the allocation (r′1, r′2, ..., r′n) where:


r′λ1 = rλ1 + 1
r′λk = rλk − 1
r′λi = rλi ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, i = 1, i = k
Because rλ1 < eλ1,tλ1 and rλk > sλk,tλk , r
′
i belongs to segment ti of Pi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Now let us compare the revenues of two allocations 〈ri〉ni=1 and 〈r′i〉ni=1. We have:
P (〈ri〉)− P (〈r′i〉)
=
n∑
i=1
(Pλi(rλi))−
n∑
i=1
(Pλi(r
′
λi))
= Pλ1(rλ1) + Pλk(rλk)
−(Pλ1(rλ1 + 1) + Pλk(rλk − 1))
= (πλ1,tλ1 · rλ1 + cλ1,tλ1 ) + (πλk,tλk · rλk + cλk,tλk )
−(πλ1,tλ1 · (rλ1 + 1) + cλ1,tλ1 )
−(πλk,tλk · (rλk − 1) + cλk ,tλk )
= πλk,tλk − πλ1,tλ1
But by inequation (4.2):
πλk,tλk ≤ πλ1,tλ1 (forward case)
πλk,tλk ≥ πλ1,tλ1 (reverse case)
Thus:
P (〈ri〉) ≤ P (〈r′i〉) (forward case)
P (〈ri〉) ≥ P (〈r′i〉) (reverse case)
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This means by taking 1 more unit from bidder λ1 and taking 1 less unit from bidder λk,
we will have a new allocation that is not less proﬁtable than the original one.
Repeating the above process, we will always get a new allocation that is not less proﬁtable
than the original one. Eventually we get an allocation 〈r(1)i 〉, that is not less proﬁtable
than the original one, where r(1)i belongs to segment ti of Pi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, and either
r
(1)
λ1
= eλ1,tλ1 or: 

r
(1)
λi
= sλi,tλi ,∀2 ≤ i ≤ n
r
(1)
λ1
= q −∑ni=2 r(1)λi
Step 2: In the case if r(1)λ1 = eλ1,tλ1 and r
(1)
λ1
< q −∑ni=2 sλi,tλi , by repeating the above
step, there exists an allocation 〈r(2)i 〉, that is not less proﬁtable than 〈ri〉, where:
• r(2)i belongs to segment ti of Pi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• r(2)λ1 = r
(1)
λ1
= eλ1,tλ1
• Either r(2)λ2 = eλ2,tλ2 or:


r
(2)
λi
= sλi,tλi ,∀3 ≤ i ≤ n
r
(2)
λ2
= q −∑ni=1,i=2 r(2)λi
By repeating the above steps again and again, we will ﬁnally stop at some step k,
1 ≤ k ≤ n and get an allocation 〈r(k)i 〉, that is not less proﬁtable than 〈ri〉, where r(k)i
belongs to segment ti of Pi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, and:


r
(k)
λi
= eλi,tλi ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
r
(k)
λi
= sλi,tλi ,∀k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
r
(k)
λk
= q −∑ni=1,i=k r(k)λi
The above lemma leads directly to the following corollary:
Corollary 4.5. The dominant set D must contain an optimal allocation.
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Lemma 4.6. The number of elements in the set D is not more than
∏n
i=1(Ni + 1).
Proof. For each tuple 〈ti〉ni=1, in which ti is a segment on Pi, there exists at most one
k,3 so the number of elements in the set D is not more than the number of such tuples.
But the number of tuples 〈ti〉ni=1 is
∏n
i=1(Ni + 1). Thus:
|D| ≤
n∏
i=1
(Ni + 1)
With these lemmas in place, we can now present our algorithm for the single-item case
(see ﬁgure 4.1). Basically, the algorithm searches through all the allocations of the set D
and chooses the most proﬁtable valid one. We can now analyse the algorithm to assess
its properties.
Theorem 4.7. The algorithm is guaranteed to ﬁnd an optimal allocation.
Proof. The algorithm searches all the allocations of the dominant set D. Also, by
corollary 4.5, the dominant set D contains an optimal allocation. Thus the algorithm is
guaranteed to ﬁnd an optimal allocation.
Theorem 4.8. The complexity of the algorithm is O(n ·(K+1)n), where K is the upper
bound on the number of segments of Pi.
Proof. The number of allocations searched by the algorithm is equal to the number of
elements of the dominant set. By lemma 4.6, the number of elements of the dominant
set is not more than
∏n
i=1(Ni + 1) ≤ (K + 1)n. Also, it takes O(log n) to sort {πi,ti}
and O(n) to ﬁnd k, so the complexity of the algorithm is O(n · (K + 1)n).
Having dealt with the multi-unit single-item case, the next subsection generalises the
algorithm to the multi-unit combinatorial case.
3There may be more than one k, for example, in the case where si,ti = ei,ti for every i, but in such
cases, it does not matter which k is chosen.
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Algorithm 3. For every tuple 〈ti〉ni=1 such that ti is a segment on Pi:
• If ∑ni=1 ei,ti < q or ∑ni=1 si,ti > q:
Continue; // Jump to the next 〈ti〉 tuple.
• Sort {πi,ti} decreasingly (increasingly).
• For k = 1 to n do:
– If
∑k
i=1 ei,ti +
∑n
i=k+1 si,ti > q:
∗ Set:

ri = ei,ti ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
ri = si,ti ,∀k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
rk = q −
∑n
i=1,i=k ri
∗ End k for loop.
• Compare P (〈ri〉) with the price of the best allocation found so far.
Figure 4.1: Clearing algorithm for multi-unit single-item case with piece-wise linear
supply function bids.
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4.1.2 Multi-Unit Combinatorial Items
As before, we deﬁne a dominant set that is proved to contain an optimal allocation.
Definition 4.9. The dominant set D is the set of all allocations 〈rji 〉 such that for every
1 ≤ j ≤ m, there exists a kj , 1 ≤ kj ≤ n, such that all rj
λj1
, ..., rj
λjk−1
equal the ending
quantities of the segments that they belong to, and all rj
λjk+1
, ..., rj
λjn
equal the starting
quantities of the segments that they belong to:4


rj
λji
= ej
λji ,t
j
λ
j
i
,∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
rj
λji
= sj
λji ,t
j
λ
j
i
,∀k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
rj
λjk
= qj −
∑n
i=1,i=k r
j
λji
where:
• tji is the segment on P ji that rji belongs to.
• (λji )ni=1 is any permutation of (1, 2, ..., n) such that {ωλji (〈t
j
λji
〉) ·πj
λji ,t
j
λ
j
i
}ni=1 is sorted
decreasingly (increasingly):
ω
λj1
(〈tj
λj1
〉) · πj
λj1,t
j
λ
j
1
≥ ω
λj2
(〈tj
λj2
〉) · πj
λj2,t
j
λ
j
2
≥ ... ≥ ω
λjn
(〈tj
λjn
〉) · πj
λjn,t
j
λ
j
n
(forward case)
ω
λj1
(〈tj
λj1
〉) · πj
λj1,t
j
λ
j
1
≤ ω
λj2
(〈tj
λj2
〉) · πj
λj2,t
j
λ
j
2
≤ ... ≤ ω
λjn
(〈tj
λjn
〉) · πj
λjn,t
j
λ
j
n
(reverse case)
From this, a number of lemmas follow:
Lemma 4.10. For every allocation 〈rji 〉 there exists an allocation in the dominant set
D that is not less proﬁtable than it.
Proof. Let 〈rji 〉 be an allocation. Let tji be the segment that rji belongs to. Suppose
(λji )
n
i=1 is any permutation of (1, 2, ..., n) such that {ωλji (〈t
j
λji
〉) · πj
λji ,t
j
λ
j
i
}ni=1 is sorted
4Similar to subsection 4.1.1, there may be many dominant sets D.
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decreasingly (increasingly):
ω
λj1
(〈tj
λj1
〉) · πj
λj1,t
j
λ
j
1
≥ ω
λj2
(〈tj
λj2
〉) · πj
λj2,t
j
λ
j
2
≥ ... ≥ ω
λjn
(〈tj
λjn
〉) · πj
λjn,t
j
λ
j
n
(forward case)
ω
λj1
(〈tj
λj1
〉) · πj
λj1,t
j
λ
j
1
≤ ω
λj2
(〈tj
λj2
〉) · πj
λj2,t
j
λ
j
2
≤ ... ≤ ω
λjn
(〈tj
λjn
〉) · πj
λjn,t
j
λ
j
n
(reverse case)
(4.3)
For any j¯, 1 ≤ j¯ ≤ m, by proving in similar manner to lemma 4.4, there exists an
allocation 〈r¯ji 〉, that is not less proﬁtable than 〈rji 〉, where r¯ji belongs to segment tji of
P ji , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m and for some k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n:
r¯j¯
λj¯i
= ej¯
λj¯i ,t
j¯
λ
j¯
i
,∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
r¯j¯
λj¯i
= sj¯
λj¯i ,t
j¯
λ
j¯
i
,∀k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
r¯j¯
λj¯k
= qj −
n∑
i=1,i=k
r¯j¯
λj¯i
r¯ji = r
j
i ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,∀1 ≤ j ≤ m, j = j¯
Repeating the above step for every j¯ from 1 to m, we complete the proof.
The above lemma leads directly to the following corollary:
Corollary 4.11. The dominant set D must contain an optimal allocation.
Lemma 4.12. The number of elements in the set D is not more than
∏n
i=1
∏m
j=1(N
j
i +1).
Proof. Consider an allocation 〈rji 〉 in D. By lemma 2, for each j¯ ranging from 1 to m,
the number of possible values of a tuple 〈rj¯i 〉ni=1 is not more than
∏n
i=1(N
j¯
i + 1). Thus,
the number of possible values of 〈rji 〉 is not more than
∏n
i=1
∏m
j=1(N
j
i + 1).
With these lemmas in place, we can now present our algorithm for the combinatorial
case (see ﬁgure 4.2), which, as before, searches through all allocations of the dominant
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set D and chooses the most proﬁtable valid one. We can now analyse the algorithm to
assess its properties.
Theorem 4.13. The algorithm is guaranteed to ﬁnd the optimal allocation.
Proof. The algorithm searches all the allocations of the dominant set D. Also, by
corollary 4.11, the dominant set D contains an optimal allocation. Thus the algorithm
is guaranteed to ﬁnd an optimal allocation.
Theorem 4.14. The complexity of the algorithm is O(mn · (K +1)mn), where K is the
upper bound on the number of segments of P ji .
Proof. The number of allocations searched by the algorithm is equal to the number of
elements of the dominant set. By lemma 4.12, the number of elements of the dominant
set is not more than
∏n
i=1
∏m
j=1(N
j
i + 1) ≤ (K + 1)mn. Also, for each j running from 1
to m, it takes O(log n) to sort {ωi(〈tji 〉) · πji,tji } and O(n) to ﬁnd k, so the complexity of
the algorithm is O(mn · (K + 1)mn).
Note that this is a worst-case analysis. In many real-life scenarios, each bidder is likely to
provide a subset of the goods/services, not all of them. So if bidder i does not provide
an item j, then N ji = 0, meaning the number
∏n
i=1
∏m
j=1(N
j
i + 1) is much smaller
than (K + 1)mn. For example, given the values suggested in [Eso et al., 2001] (that
are claimed to resemble real-life problems in the domain of e-commerce), the number
∏n
i=1
∏m
j=1(N
j
i + 1) normally reduces to 3
m(n+4)
2 . While this is certainly not an average
case analysis, it provides an indication of the complexity that may be encountered in
practice.
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Algorithm 4. For every tuple 〈tji 〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that tji is a segment on
P ji :
• For every j = 1 to m do:
– If
∑n
i=1 e
j
i,tji
< qj or
∑n
i=1 s
j
i,tji
> qj :
Continue; // Jump to the next 〈tji 〉 tuple.
– Sort {ωi(〈tji 〉) · πji,tji } decreasingly (increasingly).
– For k = 1 to n do:
∗ If ∑ki=1 eji,tji +
∑n
i=k+1 s
j
i,tji
> qj:
· Set:


rji = e
j
i,tji
,∀1 ≤ i ≤ kj − 1
rji = s
j
i,tji
,∀kj + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
rjkj = qj −
∑n
i=1,i=kj r
j
i
· End k for loop.
• Compare P (〈rji 〉) with the price of the best allocation found so far.
Figure 4.2: Clearing algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial case with piece-wise linear
supply function bids.
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4.2 Monotonic One-Unit-Diﬀerence Supply/Demand
Functions
In this section, we apply broadly the same techniques as those used in the previous sec-
tion to another class of demand/supply functions. As stated before, although this class
is not common, it is considered because the same solution as piece-wise linear can be
used and it covers another portion of the general auction clearing problem space. Specif-
ically, the case where the one-unit-diﬀerence demand/supply functions are monotonic
(non-decreasing for the forward case and non-increasing for the reverse case). That is,
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m, ∀a1, .., aj−1, aj+1, .., am:
Qji (r) = Pi(a1, .., aj−1, r + 1, aj+1, .., am)− Pi(a1, .., aj−1, r, aj+1, .., am)
is non-decreasing (non-increasing):
Qji (r + 1) ≥ Qji (r),∀0 ≤ r ≤ uji − 1 (forward case)
Qji (r + 1) ≤ Qji (r),∀0 ≤ r ≤ uji − 1 (reverse case) (4.4)
In the previous case of piece-wise linear function bids, if we limit each piece-wise linear
function to be a single segment only, then the one-unit-diﬀerence demand/supply func-
tion is constant (which is a special case of monotonicity). Thus the same technique can
be used in both the cases. As before, we ﬁrst consider the multi-unit single-item case
(subsection 4.2.1) before moving onto the combinatorial case (subsection 4.2.2).
4.2.1 Multi-Unit Single-Items
In the single-item case, the monotonicity assumption can be re-formulated as follows:
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the one-unit diﬀerence function
Qi(r) = Pi(r + 1)− Pi(r)
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is non-decreasing (non-increasing). That is:
Qi(r + 1) ≥ Qi(r),∀0 ≤ r ≤ ui − 1 (forward case)
Qi(r + 1) ≤ Qi(r),∀0 ≤ r ≤ ui − 1 (reverse case) (4.5)
Again, we deﬁne a dominant set that is proved to contain an optimal allocation.
Definition 4.15. The dominant set D is the set of all allocations (r1, r2, ..., rn) such
that there exists a k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and a permutation of (1, 2, ..., n): {λi}ni=1 such that:


rλi = uλi , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
rλk = q −
∑k−1
i=1 uλi
rλi = 0,∀k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
From this, a number of lemmas follow:
Lemma 4.16. For every allocation (r1, r2, ..., rn) there exists an allocation in the dom-
inant set D which is not less proﬁtable than it.
Proof. Let (r1, r2, ..., rn) be an allocation.
Step 1: Suppose the one-unit diﬀerence function of bidder λ1 at rλ1 is the biggest
(smallest):
Qλ1(rλ1) = max{Qi(ri)|1 ≤ i ≤ n, ri > 0} (forward case)
Qλ1(rλ1) = min{Qi(ri)|1 ≤ i ≤ n, ri > 0} (reverse case)
(4.6)
By proving similarly to the proof in theorem 1, we have: there exists an allocation {r(1)i },
which is not less proﬁtable than {ri}, where either r(1)λ1 = uλ1 or r
(1)
λ1
= q.
Step 2: In the case if r(1)λ1 = uλ1 and r
(1)
λ1
< q, by repeating the above step, there
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exists an allocation {r(2)i }, which is not less proﬁtable than {ri}, where r(2)λ1 = r
(1)
λ1
= uλ1
and either r(2)λ2 = uλ2 or r
(2)
λ2
= q − uλ1 .
By repeating the above steps again and again, we will ﬁnally stop at some step k,
1 ≤ k ≤ n, and get an allocation {r(k)i }, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, which is not less proﬁtable than the
original allocation {ri}, where {λi}ni=1 is a permutation of (1, 2, ..., n) and:


rλi = uλi , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
rλk = q −
∑k−1
i=1 uλi
rλi = 0,∀k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
The above lemma leads directly to the following corollary:
Corollary 4.17. The dominant set D must contain an optimal allocation.
Lemma 4.18. The number of elements in the set D is not more than n · 2n−1.
Proof. For any k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, let Dk be the set of all the tuples (r1, r2, ..., rn) such that
there exists a permutation of (1, 2, ..., n): {λi}ni=1 such that:


rλi = uλi , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
rλk = q −
∑k−1
i=1 uλi
rλi = 0,∀k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
We have D =
⋂n
k=1Dk. Thus:
|D| ≤
n∑
k=1
|Dk| (4.7)
The number of elements of set Dk is equal to the number of ways to choose a (k − 1)-
element subset {λ1, λ2, ..., λk−1} of the set {1, 2, ..., n} multiplied by the number of ways
to choose one element from the set {1, 2, ..., n} \ {λ1, λ2, ..., λk−1}. But the number of
ways to choose a (k − 1)-element subset of the set {1, 2, ..., n} is n!(k−1)!(n−k+1)! , and the
number of ways to choose one element from the set {1, 2, ..., n} \ {λ1, λ2, ..., λk−1} is
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(n− k + 1) (as |{1, 2, ..., n} \ {λ1, λ2, ..., λk−1}|
= n− k + 1). Thus we have:
|Dk| = n!(k − 1)!(n − k + 1)!(n− k + 1)
⇒ |Dk| = n!(k − 1)!(n − k)! (4.8)
From (4.7) and (4.8) we have:
|D| ≤
n∑
k=1
n!
(k − 1)!(n − k)!
= n ·
n∑
k=1
(n− 1)!
(k − 1)!(n − k)!
= n ·
n−1∑
k=0
(n− 1)!
k!(n− 1− k)!
= n · 2n−1
With these lemmas in place, we can now present our algorithm for the single-item case.
The algorithm is presented in ﬁgure 4.3. Again, the algorithm searches through all the
allocations of the set D and chooses the most proﬁtable valid one. The algorithm has
the following properties.
Theorem 4.19. The algorithm is guaranteed to ﬁnd the optimal allocation.
Proof. The algorithm searches all the allocations of the dominant set D. Also, by
corollary 4.17, the dominant set D contains an optimal allocation. Thus the algorithm
is guaranteed to ﬁnd an optimal allocation.
Theorem 4.20. The complexity of the algorithm is O(n · 2n−1).
Proof. The number of allocations searched by the algorithm is equal to the number of
elements of the dominant set. By lemma 4.18, the number of elements of the dominant
set is not more than n · 2n−1. Thus, the complexity of the algorithm is O(n · 2n−1).
Chapter 4 Optimal Auction Clearing Algorithms 88
Algorithm 5. For k = 1...n:
For every (k − 1)-element subset {λ1, λ2, ..., λk−1} of the set {1, 2, ..., n}:
For every λk in the set {1, 2, ..., n} \ {λ1, λ2, ..., λk−1}:
• Set:

rλi = uλi , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
rλk = q −
∑k−1
i=1 uλi
ri = 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} \ {λi}ki=1
• If 0 ≤ rλk ≤ uλk
Compare P ({rλi}) with the price of the best allocation found so far.
Figure 4.3: Clearing algorithm for multi-unit single-item case with monotonic one-
unit-diﬀerence demand/supply function bids.
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Having dealt with the multi-unit single-item case, the next subsection generalises the
algorithm to the multi-unit combinatorial case.
4.2.2 Multi-Unit Combinatorial Items
As previously, we deﬁne a dominant set that is proved to contain an optimal allocation.
Definition 4.21. The dominant set D is the set of all allocations {rji }, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
1 ≤ j ≤ m, such that: For any j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, there exists a kj , 1 ≤ kj ≤ n, and a
permutation of (1, 2, ..., n): {λji}ni=1 such that:


rj
λji
= uj
λji
, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ kj − 1
rj
λjk
= q −∑kj−1i=1 ujλji
rj
λji
= 0,∀kj + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
From this, a number of lemmas follow:
Lemma 4.22. For every allocation {rji } there exists an allocation in the dominant set
D which is not less proﬁtable than it.
Proof. For any j¯, 1 ≤ j¯ ≤ m, by proving similarly to the proof of lemma 5, there exists
an allocation {r¯ji }, which is not less proﬁtable than {rji }, where {λj¯i}ni=1 is a permutation
of (1, 2, ..., n) and there exists a k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that:
r¯j¯
λj¯i
= uj¯
λj¯i
,∀1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
r¯j¯
λj¯k
= q −
k−1∑
i=1
uj¯
λj¯i
r¯j¯
λj¯i
= 0,∀k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
r¯ji = r
j
i ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, j = j¯
Repeating the above step for every j¯ ranging from 1 to m, we complete the proof.
The above lemma leads directly to the following corollary:
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Corollary 4.23. The dominant set D must contain an optimal allocation.
Lemma 4.24. The number of elements in the set D is not more than nm · 2m(n−1).
Proof. Consider an allocation {rji } in D. By lemma 6, for each j¯ ranging from 1 to m,
the number of possible values of a tuple {rj¯i }ni=1 is not more than n · 2n−1. Thus, the
number of possible values of {rji } is not more than (n · 2n−1)m or nm · 2m(n−1).
With these lemmas in place, we can now present our algorithm for the combinatorial case.
As before, the algorithm, presented in ﬁgure 4.4, searches through all the allocations of
the set D and chooses the most proﬁtable valid one. The algorithm has the following
properties.
Theorem 4.25. The algorithm is guaranteed to ﬁnd the optimal allocation.
Proof. The algorithm searches all the allocations of the dominant set D. Also, by
corollary 4.23, the dominant set D contains an optimal allocation. Thus the algorithm
is guaranteed to ﬁnd an optimal allocation.
Theorem 4.26. The complexity of the algorithm is O(nm · 2m(n−1)).
Proof. The number of allocations searched by the algorithm is equal to the number of
elements of the dominant set. By lemma 4.24, the number of elements of the dominant
set is not more than nm · 2m(n−1). Thus, the complexity of the algorithm is O(nm ·
2m(n−1)).
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Algorithm 6. For every tuple (k1, k2, ..., km) such that 1 ≤ kj ≤ n, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m:
For every tuple {λ11, ..., λ1k1−1, λ21, ..., λ2k2−1, ..., λm1 , ..., λmkm−1} such that {λ
j
1, λ
j
2, ..., λ
j
k−1}
is a (kj − 1)-element subset of the set {1, 2, ..., n}, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m:
For every tuple {λjkj} such that λ
j
kj
is in the set {1, 2, ..., n}\{λj1 , λj2, ..., λjk−1}, ∀1 ≤ j ≤
m:
• For j = 1...m set:

rj
λji
= uj
λji
, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ kj − 1
rj
λjkj
= q −∑kj−1i=1 ujλji
rj
λji
= 0,∀kj + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
• If 0 ≤ rj
λjkj
≤ uj
λjkj
, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m
Compare P ({rλi}) with the price of the best allocation found so far.
Figure 4.4: Clearing algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial case with monotonic one-
unit-diﬀerence demand/supply function bids.
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4.3 Summary
This chapter presents, for the ﬁrst time, optimal clearing algorithms for multi-unit single-
item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions where bids are expressed through supply/de-
mand functions. Speciﬁcally, we consider two classes of supply/demand functions where
the demand/supply curves for each individual commodity are piece-wise linear (an im-
portant and often considered case) and where the demand/supply curves are monotonic
one-unit-diﬀerence. This means our algorithms enable us to deal with a more general
case than any previous work in this area. Moreover, we believe this degree of expres-
siveness is important for obtaining the maximum beneﬁt from combinatorial auctions in
practical settings.
Chapter 5
Coalition Structure Generation
Algorithm
This chapter presents our novel algorithm for coalition structure generation. We will
show that it produce solutions that are within a ﬁnite bound of the optimal. It will then
be compared with an algorithm by [Sandholm et al., 1999] which is the only other non-
trivial algorithm (i.e. not including exhaustive search) for coalition structure generation
that can also establish a ﬁnite bound of the optimal.
5.1 The Algorithm
In this section, we present our algorithm for coalition structure generation and prove
that the solution it generates is within a ﬁnite bound from the optimal.
To this end, let Lk be the set of all coalition structures with size k. Thus we have:
L =
n⋃
k=1
Lk
The number of coalition structures in Lk is S(n, k), widely known in Mathematics as
the Stirling number of the Second Kind [Roman, 1984]. The value of S(n, k) can be
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computed by the following formula [Roman, 1984]:
S(n, k) =
1
k!
k−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
k
i
)
(k − i)n
Definition 5.1. Let SL(n, k, c) be the set of all coalition structures that have exactly
k coalitions and at least one coalition whose cardinality is not less than c.
Definition 5.2. Let SL(n, c) be the set of all coalition structures whose cardinality is
between 3 and n − 1 that have at least one coalition whose cardinality is not less than
c. That is:1
SL(n, c) =
n−1⋃
k=3
SL(n, k, c)
With these deﬁnitions in place, we can now express our algorithm for solving the problem
(see ﬁgure 39). Basically, at ﬁrst it searches all the coalition structures that have one,
two or n coalitions (i.e. all the coalition structures in the sets: L1, L2 and Ln) (as
Sandholm et al.’s algorithm does). But after that, instead of searching through the
sets Lk (for 3 ≤ k ≤ n − 1) one by one (as Sandholm et al. do), our algorithm only
searches some speciﬁc subsets of Lk (see ﬁgure 5.2 for a diagramatic representation). In
particular, it searches the set of all coalition structures that have k coalitions and at least
one coalition whose cardinality is not less than n(q− 1)/q (with q running from n+14 
down to 2 as in Figure 5.1). Note that we start from q = n+14  because Sandholm et al.
showed that, after searching L1, L2, Ln, the algorithm can establish a bound b = n/2
and, later in this chapter, we will show that after searching SL(n, n(q − 1)/q), our
algorithm can establish a bound b = 2q− 1. Thus, we start from the biggest q such that
2q − 1 < n/2 or q = n+14 .
The next step is to show that the solution generated by the algorithm is within a bound
from the optimal and that the bound is reduced further after each round. Thus ours
is an anytime algorithm: it can be interrupted at any time and the bound keeps
improving with an increase in execution time.2
1In fact, as SL(n, k, c) = ∅ for all n− c+1 < k ≤ n− 1, this formula can be rewritten as: SL(n, c) =⋃n−c+1
k=3 SL(n, k, c)
2If the domain happens to be super-additive, the algorithm ﬁnds the optimal coalition structure
(grand coalition) immediately.
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Algorithm 7. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
• Step 1: Search through the sets L1, L2, Ln
• From step 2 onward, search, consequently, through the sets SL(n, n(q − 1)/q)
with q running from n+14  down to 2.
That is, search SL(n, n(n+14  − 1)/n+14 ) at step 2, search
SL(n, n(n+14  − 2)/(n+14  − 1)) at step 3 and so on.
Moreover, from step 3 onward, as SL(n, nq/(q + 1)) ⊆ SL(n, n(q −
1)/q) (it is easy to see that SL(n, n(a−1)/a) ⊆ SL(n, n(b−1)/b) for
every a > b) we only have to search through the set SL(n, n(q−1)/q)\
SL(n, nq/(q+1)) in order to search through the set SL(n, n(q−1)/q).
• At each step return the coalition structure with the biggest value (i.e. best social
welfare) so far.
Figure 5.1: The coalition structure generation algorithm.
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of the searching paths between our algorithm and Sandholm
et al.’s.
Theorem 5.3. Immediately after ﬁnishing searching SL(n, n(q − 1)/q), the solution
generated by our algorithm is within a ﬁnite bound b = 2q − 1 from the optimal.
Proof. Let CSa be the coalition structure that our algorithm generates. Let CS∗ be an
optimal coalition structure. Assume CS∗ contains t coalitions C1, C2, ..., Ct. We have
to prove:
V (CS∗)
V (CSa)
≤ 2q − 1 (5.1)
For the cases where t equals 1, 2 or n, the proof is trivial, as CSa will also be an optimal
coalition structure. Thus V (CSa) = V (CS∗), so V (CS
∗)
V (CSa) = 1 ≤ 2q − 1.
Now we only have to prove for the case where 3 ≤ t ≤ n− 1. Without loss of generality,
we can assume the cardinalities of the sets C1, C2, ..., Ct are in decreasing order. That
is:
|C1| ≥ |C2| ≥ ... ≥ |Ct| (5.2)
For the convenience of presentation, we assume Ci = ∅ and v(Ci) = 0 for every i > t.
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First, we will show that for every coalition C ⊆ A:
v(C) ≤ V (CSa)
Considering the coalition structure CS0 = {C,A \ C}. As CS0 ∈ L2, we have:
V (CS0) ≤ V (CSa)
⇒ v(C) + v(A \ C) ≤ V (CSa)
⇒ v(C) ≤ V (CSa) (because of assumption (2.4))
Thus we have:
v(Ci) ≤ V (CSa) ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1
⇒
q−1∑
i=1
v(Ci) ≤ (q − 1) · V (CSa) (5.3)
Now let us consider the other coalitions of CS∗, namely, Cq, Cq+1, ..., Ct.
Considering the following coalition structure:
CS1 = {Cq, C2q, ..., C t
q
q,D}
That is:
D = A \ ∪
t
q

i=1Ciq (5.4)
Let us analyse the cardinality of coalition D. We have for all 1 ≤ i ≤  tq :
|C(i−1)q+1| ≥ |C(i−1)q+2| ≥ ... ≥ |Ciq|(because of (5.2))
⇒ q|Ciq| ≤
q∑
j=1
|C(i−1)q+j |
⇒ q
 t
q
∑
i=1
|Ciq| ≤
 t
q
∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
|C(i−1)q+j |
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⇒ q
 t
q
∑
i=1
|Ciq| ≤ |C1|+ |C2|+ ... + |C t
q
q|
⇒ q
 t
q
∑
i=1
|Ciq| ≤ |C1|+ |C2|+ ... + |Ct| = n
⇒
 t
q
∑
i=1
|Ciq| ≤ n/q
As |D| = n−∑ tq i=1 |Ciq| (from (5.4)), we then have:
|D| ≥ n− n/q
⇒ |D| ≥ n(q − 1)/q
⇒ |D| ≥ n(q − 1)/q
⇒ CS1 ∈ SL(n, n(q − 1)/q)
⇒ V (CS1) ≤ V (CSa)
⇒ v(Cq) + v(C2q) + ... + v(C t
q
q) + v(D)
≤ V (CSa)
⇒ v(Cq) + v(C2q) + ... + v(C t
q
q) ≤ V (CSa)
(as v(D) ≥ 0, by assumption (2.4))
For all 1 ≤ j ≤ q − 1, by proving similarly to the above, we have:
v(Cq+j) + v(C2q+j) + ... + v(C t
q
q+j) ≤ V (CSa)
Thus for all 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1, we have:
 t
q
∑
i=1
v(Ciq+j) ≤ V (CSa)
⇒
q−1∑
j=0
 t
q
∑
i=1
v(Ciq+j) ≤ q · V (CSa)
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⇒
 t
q
q+q−1∑
i=q
v(Ci) ≤ q · V (CSa) (5.5)
Also:
 t
q
q + q − 1 > ( t
q
− 1)q + q − 1
⇒  t
q
q + q − 1 > t− 1
⇒  t
q
q + q − 1 ≥ t (5.6)
Thus, from (5.5) and (5.6), we have:
t∑
i=q
v(Ci) ≤ q · V (CSa) (5.7)
From (5.3) and (5.7) we have:
t∑
i=1
v(Ci) ≤ (2q − 1) · V (CSa) (5.8)
From theorem 1, we can also see that the bound decreases after each round, because
2q − 1 decreases as q decreases. Thus our algorithm is an anytime one.
Having presented our algorithm for coalition structure generation, the next section com-
pares it with Sandholm et al.’s.
5.2 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the eﬀectiveness of our algorithm we compare it against Sandholm et al.’s
[Sandholm et al., 1999] since this is the only other known algorithm with worst-case
bounds. In more detail, Sandholm et al.’s algorithm operates as described in ﬁgure 5.3.
Basically, it ﬁrst searches all the coalition structures that have 1 or 2 coalitions, then
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• Search the bottom two levels of the coalition structure graph (Note that level k of
the coalition structure graph in Sandholm et al.’s algorithm corresponds exactly
to the set Lk in ours).
• Continue with a breadth-ﬁrst search from the top of the graph as long as there
is time left, or until the entire graph has been searched (this occurs when this
breadth-ﬁrst search completes level 3 of the graph, i.e., depth n− 3)
• Return the coalition structure that has the highest welfare among those seen so
far.
Figure 5.3: Sandholm et al.’s algorithm.
it continues to search all the coalition structures that have n, n− 1, ..., 3 coalitions (in
that order). Sandholm et al. then prove that after having completed searching Lk, the
solution the algorithm generates is within a bound b′, where b′ = nh if n ≡ h−1(mod h)
and n ≡ k(mod 2), or b′ = nh otherwise (h = n−k2 + 2).
To evaluate the performance of our algorithm, we compare it with Sandholm et al.’s on a
worst-case basis. That is, we compare the size of the search space of the two algorithms
(i.e. the number of coalition structures each algorithm has to search) in order to establish
the same bound from the optimal.
To calculate the number of coalition structures that our algorithm needs to search, we
present the following formula.
Lemma 5.4. For all n > k ≥ 3 and c ≥ n/2, the cardinality of SL(n, k, c) can be
calculated as follows:
|SL(n, k, c)| =
n−k+1∑
i=c
S(n− i, k − 1) · n!
i!(n − i)! (5.9)
Proof. For each i such that c ≤ i ≤ n − k + 1, let T (n, k, i) ⊆ SL(n, k, c) be the set of
all coalition structures that have exactly k coalitions and at least one coalition whose
cardinality equals i. As for every coalition structure CS in SL(n, k, c), any coalition in
CS has at most n− k + 1 agents (because (k − 1) other coalitions in CS must contain
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at least (k − 1) agents), we have:
SL(n, k, c) =
n−k+1⋃
i=c
T (n, k, i)
Now we will show that T (n, k, i1)
⋂
T (n, k, i2) = ∅ for every i1 = i2, i1 ≥ c and
i2 ≥ c. This can be proved by contradiction. Suppose there exist i′1 and i′2 such that
T (n, k, i′1)
⋂
T (n, k, i′2) = ∅. This means there exists a coalition structure CS′ such that:
CS′ ∈ T (n, k, i′1)
⋂
T (n, k, i′2). Now CS′ ∈ T (n, k, i′1) means it has at least one coalition
whose cardinality equals i′1, and, similarly, CS
′ ∈ T (n, k, i′2) means it has at least one
coalition whose cardinality equals i′2. Moreover, CS′ has at least 3 coalitions (as k ≥ 3),
so the number of agents in CS′ will be greater or equal than i′1 + i′2 + 1. Thus:
n ≥ i′1 + i′2 + 1
⇒ n ≥ c + c+ 1 = 2c + 1
⇒ n ≥ 2n/2 + 1
⇒ n ≥ 2n/2 + 1
⇒ n ≥ n + 1
As we reach contradiction, we must have:
T (n, k, i1)
⋂
T (n, k, i2) = ∅
for every i1 = i2, i1 ≥ c and i2 ≥ c. Thus we have:
⇒ |SL(n, k, c)| =
n−k+1∑
i=c
|T (n, k, i)| (5.10)
Now let us consider a coalition structure CS′ ∈ T (n, k, i). As one of the coalitions in
CS′ has exactly i agents, k − 1 other coalitions in CS′ must have exactly n− i agents.
Also, the number of ways to choose an i-agent set from n agents is n!i!(n−i)! . Thus the
number of coalition structures in T (n, k, i) equals the number of coalition structures that
have exactly k − 1 coalitions in a multi-agent system with n − i agents multiplied with
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Figure 5.4: The case n = 50.
n!
i!(n−i)! :
|T (n, k, i)| = S(n− i, k − 1) · n!
i!(n − i)! (5.11)
From (5.10) and (5.11) we have:
|SL(n, k, c)| =
n−k+1∑
i=c
S(n− i, k − 1) · n!
i!(n − i)!
With this in place, we test the algorithms with the number of agents n = 50, 100, 500,
and 1000.3 The result of the tests are presented in the following graphs.4 As we are
calculating the number of coalition structures each algorithm has to search in order to
3We observe similar patterns with other values of n varying from 50 to 1000.
4The big bounds are not shown in the graphs (that is, bounds greater than 30 in the case n = 100,
greater than 40 in the case n = 500 and greater than 50 in the case n = 1000), because the results for
the two algorithms are nearly the same for these bounds.
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Chapter 5 Coalition Structure Generation Algorithm 104
0 10 20 30 40 50
Bound from the optimal
N
u
m
be
r 
of
 c
oa
li
ti
on
 s
tr
uc
tu
Sandholm et al.
Our algorithm
1 
10400 
10800 
101200 
101600 
Figure 5.7: The case n = 1000.
establish a bound from the optimal, the smaller the number of coalition structures the
better.
As we can see from the graphs, for large bounds from the optimal, there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the performance of our algorithm and Sandholm et al.’s: the number
of coalition structures that each has to search are similar. However, for small bounds
from the optimal, our algorithm is much faster (up to 10379 times faster in the graphs
shown here). In these cases, the number of coalition structures that our algorithm has
to search is much smaller because of our greater selectivity in searching through the
subsets of Lk.
Moreover, for small bounds, our algorithm scales very well as n increases. Thus the
bigger n is, the more our algorithm outperforms Sandholm et al.’s. For example, with
bound 3, our algorithm is more than 107 times faster for n = 50, more than 1023 times
faster for n = 100, more than 10171 times faster for n = 500, and more than 10379 times
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faster for n = 1000. Note that these numbers would continue to increase the bigger we
made n.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we developed an anytime algorithm for coalition structure generation
that can produce solutions within a ﬁnite bound from the optimal. As it is an anytime
algorithm, it can be interrupted at any time and the bound keeps improving with an
increase in execution time. We then benchmarked our algorithm against [Sandholm et
al., 1999] which is the only other known algorithm for this task that can also establish
a worst-case bound from the optimal. This comparison showed our algorithm to be
signiﬁcantly faster; for example, being up to 10379 times faster for systems containing
1000 agents for small bounds.
This algorithm addresses one of the key weaknesses in the work on coalition formation to
date (namely the complexity of coalition structure generation). With this substantially
more eﬃcient algorithm, coalition formation can start to be used in the VO operation
phase to partition the VO’s members into several subsets working on diﬀerent activities
in order to maximise the VO’s payoﬀ.
Chapter 6
Virtual Organisations in
Operation
Having detailed the mechanisms for clearing combinatorial auctions and coalition struc-
ture generation, this chapter shows how they can be applied to the activities of partner
selection and task distribution within VOs. This is done by undertaking a walkthrough
of the VO lifecycle on a particular scenario:
Suppose a festival is going to take place in Edinburgh. Identifying this business opportu-
nity, an enterprising entrepreneur decides to establish a VO to oﬀer festival attendees a
one stop shop for their trip. Thus the entrepreneur needs to bring together many hotels,
local tour organisers and airlines to meet the needs of the attendees. In so doing, the
VO will oﬀer travel packages, which include airline travel, accommodation and tours to
various attractions in and around Edinburgh.
Against this background, the chapter presents, in detail, the application of the algorithms
that we have developed in previous chapters, to automate partner selection and task
distribution in the creation, operation and maintenance phases of the VO. Speciﬁcally,
section 6.1 will address the creation phase, section 6.2 will deal with the operation phase
and section 6.3 will address the maintenance phase.
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6.1 The Creation Phase
This section will apply the auction clearing algorithms developed in chapters 3 and 4
to automate partner selection in the creation phase of the VO. Speciﬁcally, the creation
phase proceeds with the following steps:
Step 1
The VO initiator (the entrepreneur) identiﬁes the market niche and decides to form
a VO to exploit this niche; that is, a VO to provide travel packages, which includes
airline travel, accommodation and tour to various attractions in and around Edinburgh.
The VO initiator then contacts potential VO partners and sends them a call for bids as
follows:
Required services and associated quantities:
Air travel: for 400 persons
Accommodation: 400 rooms
Tour: for 400 persons
Using our formal notations introduced in previous chapters, the call for bids can be
written as (q1, q2, q3) with:
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

q1 = 400
q2 = 400
q3 = 400
Step 2
The potential VO partners (PA1, PA2, PA3, PA4, PA5, PA6) send the bids back to the
VO initiator. The services and the associated quantities oﬀered by the bidders are as
follows:
Agent Air tickets Accommodation Local tour
PA1 500 300
PA2 200
PA3 300
PA4 300
PA5 450
PA6 250
Using our formal notations, this means:

u11 = 500, u
2
1 = 300, u
3
1 = 0
u12 = 0, u
2
2 = 200, u
3
2 = 0
u13 = 0, u
2
3 = 300, u
3
3 = 0
u14 = 0, u
2
4 = 0, u
3
4 = 300
u15 = 450, u
2
5 = 0, u
3
5 = 0
u16 = 0, u
2
6 = 0, u
3
6 = 250
Suppose the details of the bids are as follows:
Bidder PA1 can provide air travel for 500 persons and accommodation for 300 persons.
The price function is as follows:
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• Air travel: from 1 — 20 persons: the price is 150/person; from 21 — 500 persons:
the price is 143/person.
Using our formal notations, this means:

P 11 (r) = 150 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 20
P 11 (r) = 143 ∗ r,∀21 ≤ r ≤ 500
• Accommodation: From 1 — 20 persons: the price is 25/person. From 21 — 300
persons: the price is 23.85/person.
Using our formal notations, this means:

P 21 (r) = 25 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 20
P 21 (r) = 23.85 ∗ r,∀21 ≤ r ≤ 300
• For a package which consists of at least 21 air tickets and at least 21 rooms, the
total price of the package is 0.99 ∗ [P (airtickets) + P (accommodation)] otherwise
the total price is P (airtickets) + P (accommodation).
Formally, this means:
P1(r1, r2) = ω1(t1, t2)(P 11 (r1)+P
2
1 (r2)) with the correlation function ω1 calculated
as follows:
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

ω1(2, 2) = 0.99
ω1(t1, t2) = 1, if t1 = 2 or t2 = 2
Bidder PA2 can provide 200 rooms with the following price function: from 1 — 10
rooms: the price is 24/person; from 11 — 200 rooms: the price is 22.5/person.
Formally, this means:

P 22 (r) = 24 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 10
P 22 (r) = 22.5 ∗ r,∀11 ≤ r ≤ 200
Bidder PA3 can provide 300 rooms with the following price function: from 1 — 20
rooms: the price is 25.5/person; from 21 — 300 rooms: the price is 24.5/person.
Formally:

P 23 (r) = 25.5 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 20
P 23 (r) = 24.5 ∗ r,∀21 ≤ r ≤ 300
Bidder PA4 can provide tour for 300 persons with the following price function: from 1
— 20 persons: the price is 30/person; from 21 — 300 persons: the price is 28.8/person.
Formally:

P 34 (r) = 30 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 20
P 34 (r) = 28.8 ∗ r,∀21 ≤ r ≤ 300
Bidder PA5 can provide air tickets for 450 persons with the following price function:
from 1 — 20 persons: the price is 148/person; from 21 — 450 persons: the price is
143.5/person.
Formally:

P 15 (r) = 148 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 20
P 15 (r) = 143.5 ∗ r,∀21 ≤ r ≤ 450
Bidder PA6 can provide tour for 250 persons with the following price function: from 1
— 15 persons: the price is 31/person; from 16 — 250 persons: the price is 30/person.
Formally:
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

P 36 (r) = 31 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 15
P 36 (r) = 30 ∗ r,∀16 ≤ r ≤ 250
Step 3: The VO initiator receives the bids, clears the auction using our clearing algo-
rithms and forms the VO.
Using our clearing algorithms, we get the following results:
• Using the polynomial algorithm:
– At round 1: Consider all the biggest packages oﬀered by the bidders (after
truncating them according to the auctioneer’s demand) and their average unit
price:
∗ Bidder PA1: the biggest package oﬀered is (400, 300, 0) (400 air tickets,
300 rooms and ) with average unit price 91.94
∗ Bidder PA2: (0, 200, 0) with average unit price 22.5
∗ Bidder PA3: (0, 300, 0) with average unit price 24.5
∗ Bidder PA4: (0, 0, 200) with average unit price 28.8
∗ Bidder PA5: (400, 0, 0) with average unit price 143.5
∗ Bidder PA6: (0, 0, 250) with average unit price 30
Thus, PA2 is selected to provide (0, 200, 0).
– At round 2: The new auctioneer’s demand is (400, 200, 400). Again, con-
sider all the biggest packages oﬀered by the bidders (after truncating them
according to the auctioneer’s demand) and their average unit price:
∗ Bidder PA1: (400, 200, 0) with average unit price 103.28
∗ Bidder PA3: (0, 200, 0) with average unit price 24.5
∗ Bidder PA4: (0, 0, 200) with average unit price 28.8
∗ Bidder PA5: (400, 0, 0) with average unit price 143.5
∗ Bidder PA6: (0, 0, 250) with average unit price 30
Thus, PA3 is selected to provide (0, 200, 0).
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– At round 3: The new auctioneer’s demand is (400, 0, 400). Again, consider all
the biggest packages oﬀered by the bidders (after truncating them according
to the auctioneer’s demand) and their average unit price:
∗ Bidder PA1: (400, 0, 0) with average unit price 143
∗ Bidder PA4: (0, 0, 200) with average unit price 28.8
∗ Bidder PA5: (400, 0, 0) with average unit price 143.5
∗ Bidder PA6: (0, 0, 250) with average unit price 30
Thus, PA4 is selected to provide (0, 0, 200).
– At round 4: The new auctioneer’s demand is (400, 0, 200). Again, consider all
the biggest packages oﬀered by the bidders (after truncating them according
to the auctioneer’s demand) and their average unit price:
∗ Bidder PA1: (400, 0, 0) with average unit price 143
∗ Bidder PA5: (400, 0, 0) with average unit price 143.5
∗ Bidder PA6: (0, 0, 200) with average unit price 30
Thus, PA4 is selected to provide (0, 0, 200).
– At round 5: The new auctioneer’s demand is (400, 0, 0). Again, consider all
the biggest packages oﬀered by the bidders (after truncating them according
to the auctioneer’s demand) and their average unit price:
∗ Bidder PA1: (400, 0, 0) with average unit price 143
∗ Bidder PA5: (400, 0, 0) with average unit price 143.5
Thus, PA1 is selected to provide (400, 0, 0).
To this end, we have the following winning agents:
PA1 (400 air tickets)
PA2 (200 rooms)
PA3 (200 rooms)
PA4 (tour for 200 persons)
PA6 (tour for 200 persons)
for a total bid price of 78360.
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• Using the optimal algorithm: by searching through the dominant set, the winning
agents are:
PA1 (400 air tickets and 200 rooms)
PA2 (200 rooms)
PA4 (tour for 200 persons)
PA6 (tour for 200 persons)
for a total bid price of 78230.
As we can see, the results from the two algorithms are diﬀerent. It is because the
polynomial, while being very fast, cannot guarantee to ﬁnd the optimal solution.
In this case, we will use the optimal result and so the members of the new VO winning
agents are: PA1, PA2, PA4, PA6.
6.2 The Operation Phase
In this section, we will examine the use of coalition structure generation algorithm
developed in chapter 5 in VO operation phase. We focus on the third service of the
VO: providing tours to various attractions in and around the city. To provide this
service, the local tour organiser members of the VO will have to coordinate with the
hotel members to pick up visitors from the hotels as well as returning them. We intend
to use the coalition structure generation to organise this service in an optimal (that is,
cost-minimising) way. In more details:
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Suppose there are 5 car centres from where the cars of the local tour organisers start:
C1, C2, C3, C4, C5 and there are 2 hotels where the visitors wait to be picked up: H1,
H2. The tour drivers then go from one of the car centres to the hotels to pickup the
visitors there, take them for a tour then come back.
The question is then to how can we decide which car centres should pickup visitors from
which hotels in order to maximise the proﬁt of the VO, that is, to minimise the cost?
To solve this, each car centre as well as each hotel is represented by an autonomous
agent. These agents are then coordinated with one another using our coalition structure
generation algorithm to maximise the payoﬀ of the system. Speciﬁcally, we partition the
set of all agents (5 car centres and 2 hotels) into several coalitions such that agents in
the same coalition cooperate with one another and agents in diﬀerent coalitions do not
cooperate. For example, suppose we partition the set of agents into the following coali-
tion structure: {(C1, C2,H1), (C3, C4, C5,H2)}. Then car centre C1, C2 will pickup
visitors from hotel H1, while car centres C3, C4, C5 will pickup visitors from hotel H2.
The value of each coalition can be calculated based on the following points:
• If a coalition C contains only car centres or hotels, then V (C) = 0, because there
is no work done.
• If a coalition C contains C1, C2,..., Cm and H1, H2, , Hn, then V (C1, C2, , Cm,H1,
H2, ,Hm) is the proﬁt that the VO gets from taking the visitors around.
The aim is then to arrange the car centres and the hotels in order to maximise the proﬁt
of the whole VO.
To illustrate how the algorithm works, we can assume the following values of the coali-
tions:
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V (C1,H1) = 20 V (C2,H1) = 32
V (C3,H1) = 23 V (C4,H1) = 21
V (C5,H1) = 20 V (C1,H2) = 22
V (C2,H2) = 31 V (C3,H2) = 33
V (C4,H2) = 45 V (C5,H2) = 20
V (C1,H1,H2) = 30 V (C2,H1,H2) = 31
V (C3,H1,H2) = 28 V (C4,H1,H2) = 29
V (C5,H1,H2) = 26 V (C1, C2,H1) = 31
V (C1, C3,H1) = 32 V (C1, C4,H1) = 44
V (C2, C3,H1) = 33 V (C2, C4,H1) = 34
V (C3, C4,H1) = 35 V (C1, C5,H1) = 32
V (C2, C5,H1) = 41 V (C3, C5,H1) = 34
V (C4, C5,H1) = 31 V (C1, C2,H2) = 32
V (C1, C3,H2) = 43 V (C1, C4,H2) = 34
V (C2, C3,H2) = 45 V (C2, C4,H2) = 33
V (C3, C4,H2) = 34 V (C1, C5,H2) = 33
V (C2, C5,H2) = 31 V (C3, C5,H2) = 42
V (C4, C5,H2) = 34 V (C1, C2,H1,H2) = 37
V (C1, C3,H1,H2) = 38 V (C1, C4,H1,H2) = 37
V (C2, C3,H1,H2) = 38 V (C2, C4,H1,H2) = 38
V (C3, C4,H1,H2) = 37 V (C1, C5,H1,H2) = 36
V (C2, C5,H1,H2) = 37 V (C3, C5,H1,H2) = 36
V (C4, C5,H1,H2) = 38 V (C1, C2, C3,H1) = 42
V (C1, C2, C4,H1) = 31 V (C1, C3, C4,H1) = 30
V (C2, C3, C4,H1) = 31 V (C5, C1, C2,H1) = 30
V (C5, C1, C3,H1) = 31 V (C5, C1, C4,H1) = 29
V (C5, C2, C3,H1) = 32 V (C5, C2, C4,H1) = 28
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V (C5, C3, C4,H1) = 31 V (C1, C2, C3,H2) = 31
V (C1, C2, C4,H2) = 29 V (C1, C3, C4,H2) = 30
V (C2, C3, C4,H2) = 31 V (C5, C1, C2,H2) = 31
V (C5, C1, C3,H2) = 30 V (C5, C1, C4,H2) = 29
V (C5, C2, C3,H2) = 30 V (C5, C2, C4,H2) = 29
V (C5, C3, C4,H2) = 31 V (C1, C2, C3,H1,H2) = 34
V (C1, C2, C4,H1,H2) = 35 V (C1, C3, C4,H1,H2) = 33
V (C2, C3, C4,H1,H2) = 34 V (C5, C1, C2,H1,H2) = 31
V (C5, C1, C3,H1,H2) = 31 V (C5, C1, C4,H1,H2) = 29
V (C5, C2, C3,H1,H2) = 32 V (C5, C2, C4,H1,H2) = 28
V (C5, C3, C4,H1,H2) = 30 V (C1, C2, C3, C4,H1) = 32
V (C1, C2, C3, C5,H1) = 31 V (C1, C3, C4, C5,H1) = 30
V (C1, C2, C4, C5,H1) = 32 V (C2, C3, C4, C5,H1) = 31
V (C1, C2, C3, C4,H2) = 43 V (C1, C2, C3, C5,H2) = 42
V (C1, C3, C4, C5,H2) = 41 V (C1, C2, C4, C5,H2) = 40
V (C2, C3, C4, C5,H2) = 42 V (C1, C2, C3, C4,H1,H2) = 46
V (C1, C2, C3, C5,H1,H2) = 44 V (C1, C3, C4, C5,H1,H2) = 45
V (C1, C2, C4, C5,H1,H2) = 44 V (C2, C3, C4, C5,H1,H2) = 45
V (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5,H1) = 30 V (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5,H2) = 31
V (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5,H1,H2) = 49
We can then use the coalition structure generation that we developed in chapter 5 to
achieve the sub-optimal solutions depends on the time of calculation permitted. The
more time for calculation, the better the solution is.
Here is the execution of our algorithm (see ﬁgure 6.1 for a diagramatic presentation)
and the result:
• After round 1 (searching layer 1, 2 and 7): the result coalition structure is:
{(C4,H2), (C1, C2, C3, C5,H1)}. The group payoﬀ is: 76.00.
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Figure 6.1: The searching steps of our coalition structure generation in the operation
phase of the scenario.
• After round 2, (searching SL(7,4)) the result coalition structure is {(C1, C2, C3,H1),
(C4,H2), (C5)}. The group payoﬀ is 87.00.1
Suppose we stop the algorithm after round 2 (with n = 7, our algorithm has only 2
rounds), we then have the following coalition structure:
1We also try searching through all the coalition structures and get the optimal one as follows:
{(C1, C4, H1), (C2, C3, H2), (C5)} with payoﬀ 89.00.
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6.3 The Maintenance Phase
As stated in chapter 1, once the VO is in operation, there are two main situations that
may arise in an uncertain environment:
• Some members fail or withdraw from the VO: in such cases, the VO will have to
ﬁnd the substitutes to add into the VO.
• The situation changes, but the members remain unchanged. This means that the
work distribution between VO members needs to be reorganised.
Each of these will now be dealt with in turn.
6.3.1 Adding New Members into The VO
In this case, some members fail or withdraw from the VO which means that the VO will
have to ﬁnd the substitutes to add into the VO. To illustrate this point, suppose member
PA1 withdraws from the VO. Now the VO will use a reverse auction mechanism (similar
to that used in the creation phase) to ﬁnd substitutions for this member. Speciﬁcally,
the VO follows the 3 steps similar to those in section 6.1.
Step 1
The VO contacts potential VO partners and sends them a call for bids. The detail of
the call for bids (the required services and the associated quantities) is as follows (this
is what PA1 provided in the VO):
Air travel: for 400 persons
Accommodation: 200 rooms
Formally, the call for bids can be written as (q1, q2) with:


q1 = 400
q2 = 200
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Step 2
The potential VO partners (PA7, PA8, PA9, PA10) sends the bids back to the VO.
Agent Air tickets Accommodation
PA7 300 150
PA8 200 250
PA9 300
PA10 250
Using our formal notations, this means:
u11 = 300, u
2
1 = 150
u12 = 200, u
2
2 = 250
u13 = 0, u
2
3 = 300
u14 = 250, u
2
4 = 0
Suppose the details of the bids are as follows:
PA7 can provide air travel for 300 persons and accommodation for 150 persons with the
following price function:
• Air travel: from 1 — 20 persons: price is 151/person; from 21 — 300 persons:
price is 148.5/person.
Formally:

P 11 (r) = 151 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 20
P 11 (r) = 148.5 ∗ r,∀21 ≤ r ≤ 300
• Accommodation: from 1 — 25 persons: price is 26/person; from 26 — 150 persons:
the price is 25.5/person.
Formally:

P 21 (r) = 26 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 25
P 21 (r) = 25.5 ∗ r,∀26 ≤ r ≤ 150
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• For a package which comprises of at least 21 air tickets and at least 26 rooms, the
total price of the package is 0.99 ∗ [P (airtickets) + P (accommodation)] otherwise
the total price is P (airtickets) + P (accommodation).
Formally:
P1(r1, r2) = ω1(t1, t2)(P 11 (r1)+P
2
1 (r2)) with the correlation function ω1 calculated
as follows:

ω1(2, 2) = 0.99
ω1(t1, t2) = 1, if t1 = 2 or t2 = 2
PA8 can provide air travel for 200 persons and accommodation for 250 persons with the
following price function:
• Air travel: from 1 — 10 persons: price is 152/person; from 11 — 200 persons:
price is 148/person.
Formally:

P 12 (r) = 152 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 10
P 12 (r) = 148 ∗ r,∀11 ≤ r ≤ 200
• Accommodation: from 1 — 20 persons: price is 25.4/person; from 21 — 250
persons: the price is 25/person.
Formally:

P 22 (r) = 25.4 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 20
P 22 (r) = 25 ∗ r,∀21 ≤ r ≤ 250
• For a package which comprises of at least 11 air tickets and at least 21 rooms, the
total price of the package is 0.98 ∗ [P (airtickets) + P (accommodation)] otherwise
the total price is P (airtickets) + P (accommodation).
Formally:
P2(r1, r2) = ω2(t1, t2)(P 12 (r1) + P
2
2 (r2)) with the correlation function ω2 calculated as
follows:
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

ω2(2, 2) = 0.98
ω2(t1, t2) = 1, if t1 = 2 or t2 = 2
PA9 can provide accommodation for 300 persons: from 1 — 20 persons: the price is
26.5/person; from 21 — 300 persons: the price is 25.5/person.
Formally:

P 23 (r) = 26.5 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 20
P 23 (r) = 25.5 ∗ r,∀21 ≤ r ≤ 300
PA10 can provide air travel for 250 persons: from 1 — 20 persons: the price is 151/per-
son; from 21 — 300 persons: the price is 147/person.
Formally:

P 14 (r) = 151 ∗ r,∀1 ≤ r ≤ 20
P 14 (r) = 147 ∗ r,∀21 ≤ r ≤ 300
Using our clearing algorithms, we get the following results:
• Using the polynomial algorithm:
– At round 1: Consider all the biggest packages oﬀered by the bidders (after
truncating them according to the auctioneer’s demand) and their average unit
price:
∗ Bidder PA7: the biggest package oﬀered is (300, 150) (300 air tickets,
150 rooms) with average unit price 107.5
∗ Bidder PA8: (200, 200) with average unit price 86.5
∗ Bidder PA9: (0, 200) with average unit price 25.5
∗ Bidder PA10: (200, 0) with average unit price 147
Thus, PA9 is selected to provide (0, 200).
– At round 2: The new auctioneer’s demand is (400, 0). Again, consider all the
biggest packages oﬀered by the bidders (after truncating them according to
the auctioneer’s demand) and their average unit price:
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∗ Bidder PA7: the biggest package oﬀered is (300, 0) with average unit
price 148.5
∗ Bidder PA8: (200, 0) with average unit price 148
∗ Bidder PA10: (200, 0) with average unit price 147
Thus, PA10 is selected to provide (200, 0).
– At round 3: The new auctioneer’s demand is (200, 0). Again, consider all the
biggest packages oﬀered by the bidders (after truncating them according to
the auctioneer’s demand) and their average unit price:
∗ Bidder PA7: the biggest package oﬀered is (200, 0) with average unit
price 148.5
∗ Bidder PA8: (200, 0) with average unit price 148
Thus, PA8 is selected to provide (200, 0).
To this end, we have the following winning agents:
PA8 (200 air tickets)
PA9 (200 rooms)
PA10 (200 air tickets)
for a total bid price of 64100.
• Using the optimal algorithm: by searching through the dominant set, the winning
agents are:
PA8 (200 air tickets and 200 rooms)
PA10 (200 air tickets)
for a total bid price of 64000.
In this case, we will use the optimal result and so the members of the new VO winning
agents are: PA2, PA4, PA6, PA8 and PA10.
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6.3.2 Re-organising The Work
In this case the situation changes in some way (e.g. the production cost of a produc-
t/service increases in some regions) but the members remain unchanged. This means
that the work distribution between VO members may need to be reorganised in order to
maximise the proﬁt of the VO as a whole. To illustrate this, consider the case in which
there is a major work road in the city in progress. This forces the tour cars to change
their route, and so the values of all the coalitions change. In response to this situation,
the VO re-calculates the coalition values and re-runs our coalition structure generation
to re-organise the work.
Suppose the new values for the coalitions are (the values those have been changed are
highlighted in bold):
V(C1,H1) = 20 V(C2,H1) = 22
V(C3,H1) = 33 V(C4,H1) = 21
V(C5,H1) = 23 V(C1,H2) = 22
V(C2,H2) = 31 V(C3,H2) = 43
V(C4,H2) = 35 V(C5,H2) = 20
V(C1,H1,H2) = 30 V(C2,H1,H2) = 31
V(C3,H1,H2) = 28 V(C4,H1,H2) = 29
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V(C5,H1,H2) = 33 V(C1,C2,H1) = 31
V(C1,C3,H1) = 32 V(C1,C4,H1) = 34
V(C2,C3,H1) = 33 V(C2,C4,H1) = 44
V(C3,C4,H1) = 35 V(C1,C5,H1) = 32
V(C2,C5,H1) = 41 V(C3,C5,H1) = 27
V(C4,C5,H1) = 31 V(C1,C2,H2) = 32
V(C1,C3,H2) = 43 V(C1,C4,H2) = 34
V(C2,C3,H2) = 45 V(C2,C4,H2) = 43
V(C3,C4,H2) = 34 V(C1,C5,H2) = 33
V(C2,C5,H2) = 31 V(C3,C5,H2) = 42
V(C4,C5,H2) = 34 V(C1,C2,H1,H2) = 37
V(C1,C3,H1,H2) = 38 V(C1,C4,H1,H2) = 37
V(C2,C3,H1,H2) = 38 V(C2,C4,H1,H2) = 38
V(C3,C4,H1,H2) = 37 V(C1,C5,H1,H2) = 36
V(C2,C5,H1,H2) = 37 V(C3,C5,H1,H2) = 42
V(C4,C5,H1,H2) = 38 V(C1,C2,C3,H1) = 34
V(C1,C2,C4,H1) = 31 V(C1,C3,C4,H1) = 30
V(C2,C3,C4,H1) = 31 V(C5,C1,C2,H1) = 30
V(C5,C1,C3,H1) = 31 V(C5,C1,C4,H1) = 29
V(C5,C2,C3,H1) = 32 V(C5,C2,C4,H1) = 28
V(C5,C3,C4,H1) = 31 V(C1,C2,C3,H2) = 31
V(C1,C2,C4,H2) = 47 V(C1,C3,C4,H2) = 30
V(C2,C3,C4,H2) = 31 V(C5,C1,C2,H2) = 31
V(C5,C1,C3,H2) = 32 V(C5,C1,C4,H2) = 29
V(C5,C2,C3,H2) = 30 V(C5,C2,C4,H2) = 29
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V(C5,C3,C4,H2) = 31 V(C1,C2,C3,H1,H2) = 34
V(C1,C2,C4,H1,H2) = 30 V(C1,C3,C4,H1,H2) = 33
V(C2,C3,C4,H1,H2) = 34 V(C5,C1,C2,H1,H2) = 31
V(C5,C1,C3,H1,H2) = 31 V(C5,C1,C4,H1,H2) = 34
V(C5,C2,C3,H1,H2) = 32 V(C5,C2,C4,H1,H2) = 28
V(C5,C3,C4,H1,H2) = 30 V(C1,C2,C3,C4,H1) = 32
V(C1,C2,C3,C5,H1) = 31 V(C1,C3,C4,C5,H1) = 30
V(C1,C2,C4,C5,H1) = 32 V(C2,C3,C4,C5,H1) = 31
V(C1,C2,C3,C4,H2) = 38 V(C1,C2,C3,C5,H2) = 42
V(C1,C3,C4,C5,H2) = 41 V(C1,C2,C4,C5,H2) = 40
V(C2,C3,C4,C5,H2) = 42 V(C1,C2,C3,C4,H1,H2) = 44
V(C1,C2,C3,C5,H1,H2) = 44 V(C1,C3,C4,C5,H1,H2) = 43
V(C1,C2,C4,C5,H1,H2) = 44 V(C2,C3,C4,C5,H1,H2) = 45
V(C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,H1) = 30 V(C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,H2) = 32
V(C1,C2,C3,C4,C5,H1,H2) = 48
Here is the result:
• After round 1 (searching layer 1, 2 and 7): the result coalition structure is:
{(C2, C4,H1), (C1, C3, C5,H2)}. The group payoﬀ is: 76.00.
• After round 2 (searching SL(7,4)): the result coalition structure is {(C3,H1),
(C1, C2, C4,H2), (C5)}. The group payoﬀ is 80.00.
We then have the following coalition structure:
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This thesis developed eﬃcient mechanisms to automate the creation, operation and
maintenance phases of the VO lifecycle. Speciﬁcally, novel algorithms were developed
for the problems of:
• partner selection
• task distribution
In the case of partner selection, the thesis used an auction mechanism, speciﬁcally,
combinatorial auctions, to select which agents should be part of the VO. To do this,
however, we needed to develop new clearing algorithms for the types of combinatorial
auctions that are most suitable to the VO environment. In particular, these algorithms
had to deal with multi-unit combinatorial auctions with bids in form of demand/sup-
ply functions. Speciﬁcally, two sets of algorithms were developed: polynomial clearing
algorithms and optimal clearing algorithms. The former operate in polynomial time
and can establish a worst-case bound from the optimal, but are not completely eﬃcient
(because the solutions that they generate may not be optimal). In contrast, the later
are guaranteed to ﬁnd the optimal solutions, but are not polynomial.
In more detail, chapter 3 developed, for the ﬁrst time, polynomial algorithms for clear-
ing multi-unit combinatorial auctions with demand/supply functions. While previous
127
Chapter 7 Conclusions 128
work has focused on single-item auctions with demand/supply curves or combinatorial
auctions with atomic propositions, we generalised the problem to multi-unit single-item
and multi-unit combinatorial auctions with discount and free disposal demand/supply
functions. For this very general case, we showed that our algorithms are of polynomial
complexity and can generate solutions that are within a bound of the optimal. Our
empirical evaluation showed that our algorithms can produce solutions that are within
a bound of the optimal that is much lower than the theoretically proved bound. Specif-
ically, all of the bounds are within the range [1, 1.025], while the theoretical bound is n
in the multi-unit single-item case, and is 2nKm−1 in the multi-unit combinatorial case
(n is the number of bidders, m is the number of items, and K is a constant). This
generalisation and the tractability of these algorithms enable the eﬃcient application of
combinatorial auctions in VO partner selection, and more generally, they are important
steps toward realising the full application potential of combinatorial auctions since it
enables us to deal with a maximally ﬂexible and eﬃcient scheme in a computationally
tractable manner.
On the other hand, chapter 4 presents, for the ﬁrst time, optimal clearing algorithms for
multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions where bids are expressed
through supply/demand functions. Speciﬁcally, we consider two classes of supply/de-
mand functions where the demand/supply curves for each individual commodity are
piece-wise linear (an important and often considered case) and where the demand/supply
curves are monotonic one-unit-diﬀerence (a less common case). Again, the expressibility
of our auction setting and the optimality of the solutions generated by our algorithms
are an important step towards the use of combinatorial auctions in VO partner selection,
as well as in the general area of e-commerce applications.
In the case of task distribution, the thesis used coalition formation mechanisms to par-
tition the set of VO members into several subsets working on various activities in order
to maximise the payoﬀ of the whole VO. Again, as one of the main reasons that hin-
ders the wide spread use of coalition formation is the computational complexity of the
coalition structure generation, we developed an algorithm to overcome this shortcoming.
Speciﬁcally, chapter 5 developed an anytime algorithm for coalition structure generation
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that can produce solutions within a ﬁnite bound from the optimal. As it is an anytime
algorithm, it can be interrupted at any time and the bound keeps improving with an
increase in execution time. We then benchmarked our algorithm against [Sandholm et
al., 1999] which is the only other known algorithm for this task that can also establish
a worst-case bound from the optimal. This comparison showed our algorithm to be
signiﬁcantly faster; for example, being up to 10379 times faster for systems containing
1000 agents for small bounds. With this signiﬁcant jump forward, we believe coalition
formation algorithms can now be used in the VO operation phase to partition the VO’s
members into several subsets working on diﬀerent activities in order to maximise the
VO’s payoﬀ.
Building on this work, there are still a number of areas for further work in terms of both
auction clearing and coalition formation.
In the area of auction clearing, further research is needed to try to lower the bound from
the optimal of the solutions of the polynomial algorithms and lower the computational
complexity of the optimal algorithm. In the former case, one way to achieve this is
to narrow down the classes of bidding functions. That is, ﬁnd special classes in which
our algorithms perform better than in the general settings investigated in this thesis.
Another direction could be to modify the way our algorithms select winning bids. In the
later case, it may be possible to apply heuristic techniques such as Branch-and-Bound.
Although when we apply these techniques, the algorithm may not be guaranteed to ﬁnd
the optimal solution, the improved complexity may make it more broadly applicable in
real-life scenarios.
Another important area of work is to try to obtain better benchmark platforms for
evaluating clearing algorithms. Speciﬁcally, although the problem generator used in this
thesis is claimed to resemble real-life problems, it is still artiﬁcial. Ideally, we would
like to benchmark the algorithms on real-life data in order to give demonstrating more
realistic results.
In the area of coalition formation, further research is needed to lower the complexity
of the coalition structure generation algorithms still further. It would also be desirable
to try to determine some lower bound and/or some upper bound on the computational
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complexity of coalition structure generation algorithms in order for them to establish a
speciﬁc bound from the optimal. The other direction is to develop heuristic algorithms
that perform well in common cases and are applicable to large multi-agent systems (that
contains hundreds of agents). Another important area is to see whether we can modify
our algorithms so that they will be more suitable to dynamic environments in which
coalition values may change and agents can enter/leave the environment. To adapt to
this environment, we may have to frequently re-calculate the coalitional values and make
the coalition formation algorithm fully distributed and more robust.
More generally speaking, further work is needed in a number of areas before the full
vision of agile VOs created on demand to fulﬁll a particular niche is truly met. Such work
includes the ability to determine, on the ﬂy, how a particular service can be composed
out of the available constituent sub-services, how the need or opportunity for a new
VO can be automatically determined, and how a VO can determine when it should be
disbanded. Nevertheless, our work on eﬃcient mechanisms for partner selection and
task distribution provide an important piece of this complex landscape.
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